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PREFACE 
During the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) and for many 
years afterwards, revolutionary soldiers and state officials 
abused, extorted, and exiled Catholic clerics. Many of the 
expatriots came to the United States, where American 
Catholics gave them aid and later committed their lives t o 
ending the persecution in Mexico. One of the leaders in 
this effort was Francis Clement Kelley, who became the 
second bishop of Oklahoma in 1924. Relying mostly on the 
Bishop's personal papers, this study analyzes Kelley's goals 
for Mexico and the methods he used in attempting to achieve 
them. 
To those who assisted and supported me in this project, 
I wish to acknowledge my gratitude. I am especially 
indebted to my major advisor, Dr. Michael Smith, whose 
excellent guidance and aid encouraged the completion of this 
effort. The other two members of the committee, Dr. Joseph 
St out and Dr. Franz von Sauer, also deserve special t hanks 
for their confidence and inspiration during the course of 
this work. 
I am particularly grateful to the staff of the 
Archdiocese of Oklahoma, who allowed me total access to 
their archives. Special thanks are owed to Secretary Helen 
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Sellers, whose kindness and assistance greatly aided my 
research there. 
I would also like to thank my daughter, Tami, who has 
provided me with inspiration by expressing her unending 
pride and confidence in my work . 
Lastly, my deepest appreciation is reserved for Tom 
Gashlin. Without his l oving concern, patience, and 
technical assistance, I could not have completed this 
project. 
i v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . 1 
II. FRANCIS C. KELLEY AND THE CHURCH-STATE CONFLICT. . 7 
III. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN MEXICO: FROM CORTEZ 
TO CARDENAS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . 26 
IV. NON-RECOGNITION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES, 
1914-1920 . ................ . 58 
v. PROPAGANDA, RESIGNATION, AND BLOOD-DRENCHED 
ALTARS, 1920-1935. • . . • • • • • ••• 93 
VI. CONCLUSION • . . . . . . . . • • 113 




The Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) was a matter of 
great concern to the United States, but it particularly 
affected American Catholics. The persecution of Catholic 
clerics that occurred under various revolutionary leaders 
produced a sense of outrage among many Catholics in this 
country as Mexican bishops, priests, and nuns sought refuge 
in the southern border states. American clergymen gave 
these expatriates food, clothing, and shelter and recorded 
their testimonies of persecution. After hearing the 
stories, they demanded that the United States take action to 
stop the reported atrocities. 
One of the most influential American spokesmen for the 
Mexican Church was Francis Clement Kelley, a priest who 
became the Bishop of Oklahoma in 1924. Kelley was a 
prolific writer. His correspondence with United States 
presidents, secretaries of state, important businessmen, and 
Catholic dignitaries attests to his deep involvement in 
Mexico's religious conflict. Kelley's correspondence 
pertaining to Mexico spans the years from 1913 to 1935. 
Besides these personal letters, Bishop Kelley wrote 
several books that reveal his perceptions of Mexico's 
Church/State conflict. Those works include The Book of Red 
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and Yellow: Being a Story of Blood and a Yellow Streak 
(1915), Blood-Drenched Altars (1935), and The Bishop Jots it 
Down {1939), his autobiography. Kelley also wrote numerous 
articles in Extension magazine and various other 
periodicals. 
Kelley's analysis of the Church/State conflict in 
Mexico was entirely influenced by his Catholic faith. For 
instance, in Blood-Drenched Altars, he cites only Mexican 
conservatives or clergymen, such as Lucas Alaman, D. 
Francisco Plancarte, Bernardino de Sahagun, Juan de 
Zumarraga, and Bernal Diaz. Due to this one-sided aspect of 
his research and the fact that he had visited Mexico only 
once, most of his writing on the subject lacks depth and 
objectivity. 
Kelley's involvement with Mexico developed as a 
consequence of his work with the Catholic Church Extension 
Society. In 1914 a priest in San Antonio, Texas, Father H. 
A. Constantineau, asked the Society for assistance in aiding 
a group of Mexican refugees who had just fled their country 
because of religious persecution. Kelley used Extension 
funds to feed, clothe, and house these men and women. He 
also listened to and recorded their testimonies about the 
ordeals they had recently undergone. After hearing their 
stories, Kelley made a commitment to try to end the 
religious persecution. 
The Bishop's papers reveal that Kelley used three 
distinct methods in his attempts to aid the Mexican Church. 
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In 1914, when he first became aware of religious persecution 
in Mexico, he advocated the withholding of United States 
diplomatic recognition from any Mexican government that 
denied religious freedom. Kelley also aided an unsuccessful 
Mexican counter-revolt. In the mid-1920s, he participated 
in an intricate propaganda campaign that denounced the 
Mexican Revolution as part of a worldwide communist plot. 
With these efforts he hoped to discredit the Mexican 
Revolution and reinstate Catholicism to its former position 
of influence. 
His first, and most moderate, approach to the problem 
of religious persecution in Mexico was the encouragement of 
a policy of non-recognition. In 1915, Kelley met with both 
President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of State William 
Jennings Bryan and encouraged the Wilson administration to 
deny recognition to Venustiano Carranza's Constitutionalist 
government. Carranza had successfully opposed conservative 
President Victoriano Huerta and restored a revolutionary 
government in Mexico. Despite Kelley's efforts, Wilson 
recognized Carranza in October 1915. Kelley reacted to 
Wilson's decision by openly criticizing him and encouraging 
Catholics to vote for his opponent, Charles Evans Hughes, in 
the election of 1916. 
Although this political action brought Kelley criticism 
and the enmity of Wilson, the Bishop continued to urge a 
policy of non-recognition. He published articles and 
editorials that sensationalized the purported atrocities 
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taking place in Mexico. Kelley wrote The book of Red and 
Yellow to raise funds and create public awareness. He 
succeeded in gaining attention, but his efforts to achieve a 
policy of non-recognition based on religious freedom 
ultimately failed. 
During the same period, from about 1915 to 1917, Kelley 
also attempted to aid the Mexican Church by assisting and 
funding a counter-revolt. He obtained financial support for 
General Felix Diaz, a political exile opposed to the 
Revolution's liberal reforms. Diaz had conspired with 
Victoriano Huerta in 1913 to overthrow Francisco Madero. 
After his self-imposed exile to the United States, Felix 
Diaz obtained financial backing from American businessmen 
and Catholic clergymen to stage another coup against the 
Carranza government. 
Diaz attracted the attention of several American 
companies, including Wrigley Chewing Gum and International 
Harvester. Xenophobia and nationalism were characteristic 
of the Revolution and these businesses were anxious to 
secure a government in Mexico that would be friendly to 
foreigners. Kelley, who wanted to see a conservative and, 
therefore, pro-Catholic administration restored to Mexico, 
collected funds from these businesses. Together, Kelley and 
the companies placed their hopes on Felix Diaz. 
The Diaz revolt was a dismal failure, and despite 
Kelley's efforts, persecution of the Mexican Church 
continued sporadically throughout the administrations of 
Alvaro Obreg6n (1920-1924) and Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-
1928). The Bishop never abandoned the struggle, but by the 
mid-1920s, he recognized the futility of seeking either a 
diplomatic or a military solution to the problem. 
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Kelley's third approach involved the use of propaganda. 
He recognized that Mexico's devastated economy required 
foreign investment. Several of Kelley's wealthy friends 
convinced him that many opportunities awaited United States' 
investors once they were assured that Mexico was a safe 
place for their money. Because Mexican administrations were 
disseminating propaganda in the United States, Kelley 
surmised that Mexico was concerned about its image. The 
Bishop believed that anti-clerical Mexican governments would 
be more congenial to the Church if negative propaganda 
discouraged American investors. 
Throughout the l ate 1920s and early 1930s, many 
Americans, including Kelley, viewed the Mexican government 
as a communist regime. Mexico was becoming more 
socialistic, beginning with a new constitution adopted in 
1917 that nationalized land and minerals. The Carranza 
government had alarmed United States' investors by 
nationalizing communication and transportation industries. 
The Revolution's a nti-clericalism also disturbed Ameri c a n 
Catholics. The Constitution of 1917 secularized education, 
and in 1934 a new amendment required that socialistic 
education be t aught in the publ ic schools. 
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Kelley reacted to these developments by designing an 
elaborate propaganda program. Along with his friend, Eber 
Cole Byam, a self-proclaimed expert on Mexico, Kelley 
produced a plan that outlined the exact steps to be followed 
in this campaign. His intention was to alarm Americans by 
convincing them that the Mexican government intended to 
destroy religion and steal American-owned properties in 
Mexico. 
This last plan of Kelley's also failed to produce the 
results for which he had hoped. Americans generall y were 
not concerned about Mexico and the Church's problems. The 
fear of communism raged briefly and then died out as the 
public lost interest. In Mexico, the relationship between 
President Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940) and the Church 
gradua lly became more congenial as the new administration 
concentrated on rebuilding the economy and encouraging 
national harmony. After twenty-one years of trying to 
restore the Church's status as it had existed before the 
Revolution, Kelley finally resolved himself to accepting the 
new status quo. 
CHAPTER II 
FRANCIS C. KELLEY AND THE 
CHURCH-STATE CONFLICT 
Francis Clement Kelley devoted over twenty years of his 
life to ending the persecution of Catholic clerics in 
Mexico. During this time he wrote books, pamphlets, 
articles, and letters decribing the atrocities committed 
against clergymen during the Revolution. He was determined 
to see that these men and women returned to their native 
land and regained the influence they had enjoyed before the 
Revolution. 
The displaced archbishops, bishops, priests, and nuns 
stated that men under Pancho Villa, Alvaro Obregon, and 
other military leaders committed outrages against the 
clergy. They described churches converted into barracks and 
storage buildings. Some recounted the destruction of 
archives and libraries, the public burning of furniture, the 
damaging of religious statues, and the profanation of sacred 
vessels. Revolutionary generals had closed the seminaries 
and impressed the students into their armies. 1 According to 
the Catholic World newspaper, some commanders had ordered 
their men and female camp followers to "eat, drink, gamble, 
and sleep in the churches" to prove that ecclesiastical 
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buildings were not really sacred. They even fed the Holy 
Eucharist to their horses. 2 
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The revolutionaries physically and psychologically 
abused the clergymen. Soldiers paraded the priests through 
the streets and ridiculed them. They held the upper clergy 
for ransom and forced them to beg door-to-door for money to 
aid the Revolution. Another form of extortion was mock 
execution, which often took the form of a "half-hanging." 
When priests could not collect the required amount of money, 
the soldiers threatened them with death; they even placed a 
noose around the victim's neck, hoping that they would admit 
to having other sources of cash or valuables. Still, these 
men had been fortunate; soldiers had imprisoned or murdered 
other clergymen. 3 
The most compelling testimonies, however, were those 
pertaining to nuns. Many of the exiled men and women stated 
that they had heard of nuns who were raped. They claimed 
that some of the victims believed they were pregnant or had 
venereal diseases as a result of their ordeals. 4 Referring 
to them in a speech in Chicago, Kelley said that "There have 
been many instances where girls have asked their conf~ssor 
if it would be right for them to commit suicide to escape 
their shame." In the same address, Kelley stated that the 
conditions in Mexico were worse than those in Belgium; of 
course, he was referring to World War !. 5 These accounts 
about nuns always produced the most compassion, but they 
also caused some skepticism. 
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Kelley never supplied the names of witnesses or 
mentioned specific places in his accounts of religous 
persecution. For that reason, many readers doubted the 
validity of some of his accusations against the 
revolutionaries, especially those pertaining to nuns. His 
own reason for omitting these specific details was to 
protect the victims and witnesses from recrimination upon 
their return to Mexico. 6 A more feasible explanation, 
however, is that Kelley could not substantiate the claims of 
rape against nuns even though he belived they were true. 
None of the accounts about rape came from victims or 
eyewitnesses; all were second- and third-hand reports. 
These stories were always the most effective in provoking 
outrage, and Kelley did not want to omit them. Their 
inclusion, however, threatened his credibility. 7 
John Tracy Ellis, in his biography of Cardinal James 
Gibbons of Baltimore, noted that, in the beginning the 
Cardinal was "suspicious" of Kelley•s evidence. When Kelley 
first reported the atrocities to Richard Tierney, editor of 
the Jesuit weekly America, he told the editor that "[t]he 
difficulty is with regard to the stories [about] the 
Sisters. While there is no doubt at all regarding the truth 
of the matter, it is most difficult to find actual 
evidence." Several years later, Reverend R. Planchet of 
Devine, Texas, asked for permission to reprint the 
affidavits in their original Spanish. Kelley refused to 
turn them over, saying that Archbishop Quigley and his 
"Mexican advisors" had discouraged it because of the 
"shocking" nature of the testimony. 8 
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Historians Charles C. Cumberland and Robert E. Quirk 
conclude that the revolutionaries physically abused priests 
and held them for ransom, but they admit that there is 
little evidence to support the accusation that nuns were 
raped. J. Lloyd Mecham points out that many of the claims 
made by the Church are impossible to ascertain. Mecham, 
however, thought that Kelley's accounts were "substantially 
correct. "9 
As Kelley became the friend and official spokesman for 
these Mexican clerics, he gained national attention for his 
efforts on their behalf. He had already achieved some 
notoriety as the creator of the Catholic Church Extension 
Society. He was recognized as being energetic, innovative, 
and ambitious. 
It is sometimes difficult to know a person simply by 
reading his books and correspondence or observing his frozen 
image in a photograph. Francis Kelley, however, was a man 
who never shied away from self expression, and, therefore, 
one may still feel acquainted with him through his work. In 
appearance Kelley was a man of medium height, a bit rotund, 
with a broad smiling Irish face. Judging from black and 
white photos, he appears to have had light brown or reddish 
hair. Although he did not look overly-studious, his 
portraits project the image of a fatherly and wise figure. 
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Kelley emerges from his writings as a man with great 
charm and a wonderful sense of humor. He exemplified this 
aspect of his personality in his autobiography, The Bishop 
Jots It Down. In this work, Kelley reveals himself as an 
astute observer of humanity and a great lover of people. He 
records his recollections with such warmth and humor that 
the reader often feels compelled to smile or even to laugh 
out loud. For instance, when describing a long-winded 
speaker he had once heard, he said the man was "an orator 
without terminal facilities. " 1° Kelley's humor could be 
sarcastic or biting at times as in a remark about the 
similarity between Joel Roberts Poinsett and the flowering 
plant that bears his name: "They must generally be grouped 
. to conceal their bare crooked stems." 11 Speaking of 
the Mexican dictator Santa Anna, he noted that "(a] little 
one-legged Highness made a poor show of majesty."u He also 
called William Jennings Bryan "one of the most picturesque 
and brilliant failures in American political history. " 13 
Another obvious aspect of Kelley's personality was his 
pride. He was known to be fastidious in his dress and his 
surroundings. All who knew him noticed that he was always 
courteous and mannerly, two characteristics that he greatly 
admired in others. Kelley had a genuine a ppreciation for 
the better things in life and was devoted to good food and 
expensive tobaccos • 14 Many of his associates were critical 
of his materialism, e specially when he established his 
office for the newly-created Extension Society in 1905. 
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People remarked that it was quite "elegant." During this 
time he lived at the posh University Club in Chicago, while 
other priests were required to live in far less luxurious 
parish houses. 15 
This same pride could at times reveal itself as extreme 
sensitivity or stubborness; in fact, he himself called this 
tendency a "miserable weakness. " 16 For instance, in 1930 
when the position of vice-chancellor of the Extension 
Society became open, he fully expected to receive the 
appointment. When he was not offered the prestigious post, 
he spitefully disassociated himself from the entire 
organization for ten years • 17 
He was extremely ambitious and coveted publicity. When 
Kelley did not get his way, he sometimes broke the chain of 
command, even appealing directly to the Vatican if 
necessary. This type of independence and arrogance often 
caused friction with his superiors; in fact, some clerics 
believed that he was made Bishop of Oklahoma because the 
hierarchy disapproved of his actions. Many thought that 
Kelley was sent to the unimportant bishopric to remove him 
from the limelight. 18 
Kelley always acted boldly. Many of his 
accomplishments were vast in scope and required that he deal 
with important figures on an equal footing. He seldom, if 
ever, recoiled from that challenge. A brief overview of his 
childhood and young manhood will demonstrate that this 
courage and determination were innate and not simply 
acquired through experience. 
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A native of Canada, Francis Clement Kelley was born on 
Prince Edward Island in 1870; he was the second of eight 
children and the oldest son. His father, a rather austere 
man, owned a small store, farmed, and was a rural 
magistrate. As a child, Kelley d i d not exhibit any 
extraordinary talents or virtues; in fact, h i s father once 
told him that he would probably never accomplish much in 
life because he appeared to be lazy. This criticism, given 
when Kelley was a teenager, stung him; from that point 
forward he determined to become a person of whom his parents 
would be proud. 19 While in college, he gained an 
extraordinary appreciation for his Catholic faith and 
decided to enter the priesthood. Kelley later remarked that 
at that moment, he "saw the Church as a whole. The 
picture," he said, "charmed me with its beauty and satisfi ed 
me by its logical completeness." 20 
The future bishop attended St. Dunstan's College in 
Quebec, and while there he learned to speak French. Later 
in life he would remark that "[t]he trouble with most of us 
is that we know onl y one language and therefore know only 
ourse lves- -our race, our nation, our ideas of government, 
our systems. "21 Many people would accuse him of this same 
sort of narrow-mindedness in regards to Mexico. 
I n 1893, Kelley was or d ained at Ni c ole t Seminary i n 
Quebec and sent to the diocese of Detroit. He was later 
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appointed pastor of Lapeer, Michigan. In Lapeer, the young 
pastor was overseeing the construction of a new church when 
the Spanish-American War broke out. He considered the war 
"an American crime" but volunteered to go anyway. He felt 
it his duty to provide his services and it also offered him 
the opportunity to insure himself for the amount of money 
needed to complete the church. He spent most of the short 
war in Florida and Alabama, and he never saw action.n 
Between 1899 and 1906 he became a Chatauqua lecturer in 
order to raise funds for the still unfinished church. A 
fellow lecturer on this circuit was a man who would later 
play a major role in Kelley's life--William Jennings Bryan. 
In 1912 Bryan became Woodrow Wilson's first Secretary of 
State and as such was an adversary of Francis Clement Kelley 
over Mexico. 23 
In Kelley's opinion, the greatest benefit of his 
lectures was demonstrating to westerners, as he put it, that 
Catholics "did not really conceal horns under [their] hair 
or use shoes to cover cloven hoofs."~ An anti-Catholic 
sentiment pervaded the country during this time. Prejudice 
was more pronounced in the newer states, where Catholics 
still constituted a small minority.~ 
The prevalence of this attitude nationwide can be 
deduced from the fact that Woodrow Wilson participated in a 
college debate in which the issue was "the Roman Catholic 
element" as "a menace to American Institutions."26 In 1912, 
Kelley was told that there were rumors of Wilson's "hostile 
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inclination ••. towards •.• Catholics." 27 Kelley did 
not vote for Wilson, but it was only because he was a 
Republican. However, he would later come to view both 
Wilson and William Jennings Bryan as anti-Catholic when, in 
his opinion, they seemed to show little concern for the 
plight of Mexican Catholics during the Revolution.~ 
Kelley was sensitive to criticism of his Catholic 
faith. Perhaps the most significant observation that can be 
made about him is that, above all other earthly things, he 
loved the Church. He lived in a time when many Americans 
still feared Catholics. He worked hard to disprove the 
stereotypes that many people associated with Catholicism. 
It is important to recognize this tendency when trying to 
comprehend how he later became so obsessed with the Church 
in Mexico. 
Another result of his travels on the lecture circuit 
was his conception of the idea for a Catholic home mission. 
While touring in the more remote parts of the country, he 
noticed that there was a great need to provide s ervices to 
the Catholics living there and also to promote conversions. 
In 1905, while in Ellsworth, Kansas, he wrote a pamphlet 
entitled "Little Shanty Story" to promote his plan. It 
attracted the attention of James Edward Quigley, Archbishop 
of Chicago. With Quigley's support, the Catholic Church 
Extension Society was formed in 1905 and became a remarkable 
success. The Society was responsible for the construction 
of more than one-half of the new Catholic churches built 
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during the early 1900s. It eventually expanded outside the 
United States into Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and 
Canada. 29 In 1910, a committee of the Extension Society 
told Pope Benedict XV that it was "universally admitted that 
Francis Clement Kelley [had] promoted and successfully 
organized the greatest movement for the salvation of souls 
yet established in the Church of the United States."30 
Perhaps the most important by-product of the Society 
was Extension magazine. Eventually, this weekly periodical 
gained the largest circulation of any religious publication 
in the world. The magazine became valuable to Kelley as a 
vehicle to carry his messages before the public about the 
Mexican Church.u When Kelley left Chicago to become the 
Bishop of Oklahoma in 1924, he missed having this 
publication at hand. In fact, he later felt that the 
"Mexican Bishops •.. practically ignored [him]" after the 
move because he was "nothing but a poor missionary" and 
"could not be of as much service to them as" before. 32 
The loss of his magazine, however, did not keep Kelley 
from publishing. He loved to write. In all, he published 
seventeen books, including a Catholic history of Mexico, 
some fiction, a play, and an autobiogra phy. One of his 
first books, Letters to Jack (1917), survived ten editions, 
demonstrating the popular appeal of his work.~ 
Kelley's writing style was the key to his success. 
Although not a great writer, he had a natural sense of drama 
and a talent for expressing emotion. He was still a 
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nineteenth-century romanticist at a time when others were 
breaking away from colorful and poignant phrases to settle 
for more clipped, journalistic styles. Kelley did not lose 
this inclination with time, as shown by this excerpt from 
Blood-Drenched Altars, written in 1935: 
I had enough of dreamers; wild-eyed patriots 
spouting poetry . • • crazy theorists . . . 
[making] marble statues out of cloud banks . 
ambitious madmen in palaces . • • fools in hovels 
idealizing their rags and all the while longing to 
change them by theft for ermine • • • fighters on 
the battlefield rising to a murderers heaven on 
the miasma of death.~ 
A survey of Kelley's writing reveals a man driven by 
causes and broad, but impersonal crusades. He seems to have 
found relating to humanity in a collective sense easier than 
forging intimate bonds with individuals. Kelley had many 
friends, but he kept them at a comfortable distance. His 
concern for friends and family had a paternalistic, 
lecturing quality. For instance, in Letters to Jack, which 
was written to his nephew, he advised the young man about 
the ways humans can best interact with one another and gain 
acceptance within the community.~ 
Kelley undertook much of his writing for practical 
reasons. He was a man who could not only draw people's 
sentiments to a cause but could gain access to their 
pocketbooks as well. The Bishop was even able to raise 
funds from Protestants.~ He wrote the Book of Red and 
Yellow primarily to solicit aid for Mexican refugees. As a 
result, he collected contributions that vastly alleviated 
the financial pressures on the parishes along the southern 
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border. Cities such as San Antonio, El Paso, Laredo, 
Galveston, and New Orleans were crowded with exiled 
clergymen who refused to disperse and relieve the burden on 
local communities. By 1914, San Antonio alone had attracted 
four archbishops, five bishops, and forty priests.n 
Appeals through Extension magazine and the sale of The Book 
of Red and Yellow helped provide the means to shelter, feed, 
and clothe these men.~ 
Through his association with the Mexican clerics, 
Kelley learned of the atrocities taking place in Mexico. He 
recorded their testimonies in notarized affidavits. Kelley 
found that these men and women were intelligent and well-
educated and that many were bilingual. Many of the clerics 
in exile were Europeans because the revolutionaries 
particularly resented foreign clergymen. All of them loved 
Mexico and hoped to return there as soon as possible. They 
were not anti-American and did not want the United States to 
intervene militarily in Mexico. Kelley noted that almost 
every witness described the same sorts of outrages; this 
fact convinced him that he must do something to relieve 
their plight. From these testimonies he composed The Book 
of Red and Yellow. 39 
In this expose, Kelley lists the outrages that the 
Mexican clerics had suffered in their native land. His 
simple but highly emotional text evokes compassion for the 
cleri cs and outrage against both the Mexican government and 
the Wilson administration. Besides the actions already 
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mentioned, Kelley describes the robbery and desecration of 
graves.~ He discusses how some priests were forced to 
sweep the streets and undergo various other types of 
humiliation. A prioress told him that at her convent men 
and women used religious clothing as "saddle blankets and 
ornaments" on horses. The soldiers drank from Church vases 
or used them as "night vessels." They even converted some 
churches into dance halls.~ 
The most prevalent form of persecution was extortion. 
A typical case involved Francisco Villa and his men who told 
a group of priests that they would die unless they could 
raise one million pesos. When the clerics complained that 
the amount was unreasonable, the villistas asked them how 
they would like to die, by hanging or firing squad? The men 
informed the priests that their graves already had been dug 
and that they needed to prepare their wills. The soldiers 
then sent the clergymen to beg funds from the local 
community. The citizens were so frightened for their 
priests that they gave all they could. The priest who told 
the story to Kelley said that "even the little children gave 
them their pennies. "42 After the clergymen had obtained as 
much as possible, they were sent to the United States.~ 
As Kelley publicized these accounts, he also made a 
point of blaming the Wilson administration for what was 
happening in Mexico. Kelley justified his accusations 
against Wilson by claiming that the President assisted in 
the overthrow of Victoriano Huerta, who had been friendly to 
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the church. After Huerta's downfall, the revolutionaries, 
who were persecuting the Church, obtained national power. 
Kelley stated that it was easy to understand how the 
administration might have been deceived since ."they are not 
on the ground."~ Kelley believed that the deceivers were 
American Protestants and Masons who wanted to see 
Catholicism destroyed in Mexico.~ 
In 1917, the revolutionary government of Venustiano 
Carranza adopted a new constitution that further angered 
Kelley. The document severely restricted the autonomy of 
the Church by limiting the number of priests who could 
practice, eliminating foreign priests, outlawing religious 
orders, removing the Church from the education process, and 
denying the institution a political identity. The 
constitution's anti-clerical clauses convinced Kelley that 
the revolutionaries sought to obliterate Catholic influence 
from Mexican society.~ 
In The Book of Red and Yellow, Kelley claimed that 
Mexico could not manage its affairs without "the advice of a 
big brother. " 47 In the the same book, he eloquently 
summarized his interpretation of the historical role of 
Catholicism in Mexico. Speaking as the Church personified, 
he asked the country to: 
"[s]how me one good thing ••. I did not give 
you... . Cut away from your country all that I 
put 1n 1t, and see what remains. You may thrust 
me out, exile my bishops, murder my priests, again 
s~ea~ my schools, desecrate my sanctuaries and my 
v1rg1ns, but you cannot blot out history, you can 
not erase the mark I have left on you--not in a 
century of centuries."~ 
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Kelley viewed the destruction and turmoil of the 
Revolution in Mexico as a result of the loss of Church 
influence. He thought that the solution to the conflict was 
the restoration of the Roman Catholic Church as the nation's 
most respected and influential institution, its moral 
authority, and its educator. He believed that Mexico's most 
illustrious period had been the era of Porfirio Diaz (1876-
1910), a dictator who had been conciliatory toward the 
Church. Dia z had modernized the country, but his policies 
had also caused social discontent that eventually led to the 
Revolution. 
Many of the revolutionaries, on the other hand, were 
convinced that the Church's social and political power in 
Mexico must be d e stroyed. Their determination resulted from 
many years of struggle between liberal and conservative 
forces that developed shortly after Mexico won its 
independence in 1821. By 1935 when Kelley's involvement 
with Mexico ended, liberals not only had separated the 
Church from the State but had made it submissive to the 
government as well. The religious conflict that Francis 
Clement Kelley witnessed during the Revolution had its roots 
in nineteenth century Mexico. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN MEXICO: 
FROM CORTEZ TO CARDENAS 
There is no comparison between the influence of any 
single religious institution in the United States and that 
of the Roman Catholic Church in Mexi co. Spanish Catholicism 
~n colonial Mexico produced a monopolistic, elitist 
institution that was identified with the mot her country. 
Foll owing independence, the Church refused to adapt to 
democratic forms of government and chose to align with 
conservative, authoritarian regimes in order to maintain its 
privileged status. During the nineteenth century, Mexican 
liberals became convinced that the Church was an impedime nt 
to progress and must, therefore, not only be separate from 
the State but submissive to it as well. 
Unlike many English settlers who came to the New World, 
the Spaniards were not at odds with their sovereign in 
regards to religion. In fact, the Spanish Conquest was an 
act of glorification of both the monarch and the Catholic 
faith. Shortly after subduing the Aztecs, Cortes asked 
Charles V to send friars to conve rt t hem. The process of 
col on i zation , therefore , r equired t he inte grat i on o f a 
vastly different indigenous culture into the Spanish system. 
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Throughout the Colonial Period, however, Spaniards always 
dominated the political, social, and religious spheres.' 
Because of Iberian domination, Catholic clerics failed 
to produce a "native priesthood" in New Spain. As Robert 
Ricard notes, their neglect prevented the Church from 
"striking deep roots in the nation [and] gave it the 
appearance and character of a foreign institution." It also 
made the Church "dependent upon the mother country. " 2 The 
reason for this development centered on a basic assumption 
that the Indians were inferior and, therefore, incapable of 
understanding the intricacies of Western theology. During 
the Colonial Period, only 32 of 171 bishops and archbishops 
were Arnerican-born. 3 A shortage of foreign priests later 
necessitated the recruitment of native clergymen, but even 
then, they were relegated to the poorest parishes. 
Understandably, American-born Spaniards, or criollos, and 
the indigenous peoples perceived the Church as an elitist 
institution. 4 
The Catholic Church received special privileges from 
the Spanish crown that allowed it to become a powerful 
entity in the New World. The most important of these was 
its status as the official state religion, which meant in 
essence, that Catholicism in Spanish America never had to 
compete with other religions for influence. Another 
significant privilege was the fuero eclesiastico, or the 
right to try clergymen in the Church's own courts. As 
historian Richard N. Sinkin describes it, the fuero 
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essentially created a "state within the state. "5 The most 
important privilege from an economic standpoint was the 
system of mortmain. This legal advantage allowed the Church 
to accumulate vast amounts of property that could never be 
alienated and was exempt from taxation. In addition, the 
Church became the primary lending institution of the Spanish 
colonies and grew wealthy from benefices, investments, and 
mortgages. 6 
The Church enjoyed these special privileges and also 
held great control over the general populace in New Spain. 
It maintained a pervasive influence over every aspect of the 
individual's existence. Through education; the confes-
sional; the Inquisition; marriage, birth, and death rites; 
and the power of excommunication; the Catholic clergy 
exercised spiritual and social control. 7 Sinkin notes that 
"At every major juncture in his life the Mexican was 
required to pledge once again his obedience to the Church." 8 
Although the Church held much power in New Spain, the 
Crown restricted its autonomy. The king maintained several 
privileges that allowed him to control the Church, such as 
the "royal patronage" or the right to nominate vaca nt 
clerical positions. The monarch also had the right to 
determine the boundaries of future dioceses, receive and 
distribute a portion of the ecclesiatical tithes, and veto 
all Papal correspondence. Spain further required the 
colonial Church to s e ek permission before building churches, 
monasteries, or hospitals. 9 
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The Catholic Church was the most visible aspect of the 
traditional Old World system in the Americas. The colonists 
associated it with European monarchism and the Papacy and 
recognized it as an epitome of elitism. J. Lloyd Mecham 
points out that dissatisfaction with the Church was not a 
major cause of independence; nevertheless, the clergy's 
actions during the revolt, and throughout the nineteenth 
century, caused Liberals to harbor resentment toward it • 10 
By 1810, when the movement for independence began, the 
colonial Church had become politically and economically 
weakened and experienced a severe shortage of clerics. This 
condition resulted from several royal decrees issued during 
the eighteenth century that attempted to curtail the power 
of the orders. One of these decrees ordered the expulsion 
of the Jesuits in 1767. In 1804, to raise funds for its war 
against Great Britain, the Crown began to force loans from 
mortgages held on chantries and pious works in New Spain. 
This action particularly affected the lower clergy, who were 
dependent on these funds for their livelihood . 11 
Dissatisfaction within the priesthood was evident as 
the ' Independence movement began. Several priests, including 
Miguel Hidalgo and Jose Maria Morelos, not only supported 
separation from Spain but also led the uprising. The 
colonial hierarchy condemned this action and excommunicated 
the two men. In 1820, however, when liberal reforms were 
forced upon the Spanish king, the American episcopate 
changed its allegiance and supported independence. The 
hierarchy now feared that loyalty to the mother country 
would entail the loss of its own privileges .'2 
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Following independence in 1821, Mexico experienced 
thirty-four years of rebellions and counterrebellions. This 
period produced forty-five governments and five 
constitutions. These conflicts largely resulted from the 
struggle between the Liberals, or Federalists, and the 
Conservatives, or Centralists. The Centralists included the 
landed aristocracy, the military, and the clergy. The group 
was comprised almost entirely of urbanites; many were avowed 
monarchists. The opposing Federalists consisted of liberal 
criollo and mestizo (mixed blood) professionals and 
intellectuals. They were democratic in ideology and 
supported a federalist system. 13 
The Centralists believed that Catholicism was an 
important part of the traditional system that should be 
retained in Mexico. An integral aspect of the Old World 
system was its assumption that society was based on a God-
given hierarchy that required some men to be followers and 
others to be leaders. Therefore, Conservatives, especially 
clergymen, opposed democracy . 14 The most prominent 
spokesman for the Centralists, Lucas Alaman, thought that 
Catholicism was the only institution that united all 
Mexicans. The anarchy that followed independence convinced 
Alaman and other conservatives such as Jose Maria Gutierrez 
de Estrada that foreign liberal ideas were the cause of 
Mexico's turmoil. They believed that Mexicans were not 
prepared for republicanism and that only a constitutional 
monarchy would restore order and stability . 15 
British and French political philosophy, however, 
influenced the Federalists. They believed in the concepts 
of individual human rights and a division of political 
powers . 16 The Liberals were generally young professionals 
who had been educated in secular institutions; many could 
not remember living under the Spanish monarchy. The 
majority were mestizos who resented the prejudice and 
arrogance of the elitist conservatives and the Church . 17 
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As children or young men, most of the Liberals had 
experienced or witnessed injustices committed by clergymen. 
For instance, Melchor Ocampo knew of a priest who had 
refused to bury a man because the man's widow lacked the 
required fee. Another prominent Liberal, Benito Juarez, had 
been jailed in the 1830s when a Church official ordered his 
arrest for defending a village "against the excessive 
demands of [their] local curate. " 18 Liberals denounced the 
clergy for their excessive fees for baptisms, marriages, and 
funerals. The inability of the poor to pay these fees 
contributed to debt peonage as people borrowed the money 
needed for these services from their landlords. It also 
resulted in a high rate of illegitimacy because couples 
could not afford to pay for the marriage ceremony. As a 
result of these types of clerical injustices, a l most all of 
the Li berals wer e a nticlerical. w 
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Men such as Jose Maria Luis Mora and Lorenzo de Zavala 
believed that social attitudes must change before Mexicans 
would be receptive to new political ideas. Liberals were 
convinced that identification with "corporate" entities such 
as the Church, haciendas, ejidos (communally-owned land), 
and the military, prevented Mexicans from developing a sense 
of nationalism. Therefore, they considered these groups, 
especially the Church, obstructions to progress.w 
In 1824, Mexicans established a federal republic under 
a new constitution. As a concession to the Centralists, the 
Federalists compromised over the issue of religion. The 
Conservatives, led by Fray Servando Teresa de Mier and 
Carlos Marla de Bustamante, were able to retain Roman 
Catholicism as the official religion. The republic would 
continue to deny religious toleration, and both the Church 
and the military would retain their fueros. 21 
From independence until the Mexican-American War (1846-
1848), the prevailing political trend in Mexico was the 
development of strong, autonomous leaders known as 
caudillos. Perhaps the most important of these charismatic 
men was Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, who became president of 
Mexico eleven times. Santa Anna began his political career 
as a Liberal, but because he seemed to have no real sense of 
loyalty or political conviction, he became a defender of 
conservatism. 22 
In 1833, Mexicans elected Santa Anna and Valentin Gomez 
Farias president and vice-president, respectively. Gomez 
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Farias was a staunch Liberal who immediately instituted 
reforms against the military and the Church. These reforms 
abolished fueros, secularized education, declared monastic 
vows non-binding, made the State responsible for clerical 
appointments, and declared that the tithe was no longer 
mandatory. Conservatives were outraged and convinced the 
unscrupulous Santa Anna to oust Gomez Farias and rescind the 
reform legislation. In 1836, the Conservatives drafted a 
new constitution that restored the Church's status under the 
Constitution of 1824.D 
Sinkin states that "The Santa Anna dictatorship was . • 
• the precipitating event in the development of a liberal 
Reform movement in Mexico." Santa Anna expelled almost all 
of the Liberals during his dictatorship. In the United 
States these exiles joined together and developed a common 
ideology and distinct goals. The most immediate objective 
of the Liberals was to oust Santa Anna, and in 1855 they 
succeeded in doing so under the banner of the Revolution of 
Ayutla.~ 
Another of the Liberals' primary goals was to curtail 
the power of the Church. The progressive group felt a great 
deal of bitterness toward the clergy for their perceived 
part in the war with the United States from 1846 to 1848. 
In 1846, the Mexican government sent General Mariano Paredes 
to oppose a northern invasion by the United States, but 
Paredes led his men to the capital and overthrew his own 
government instead. The Church supported Paredes, and, in 
34 
return, he appointed twenty clerics to Congress.~ One 
year later, when President Gomez Farias attempted to 
expropriate Church property to fund the war effort, a pro-
clerical army known as the "Polkos" attacked the 
government.u Liberals emerging under the leadership of 
Benito Juarez considered the Church's actions during the war 
treasonous. 27 
As the Liberals gained control of the central 
government following the Ayutla movement, they instituted a 
number of sweeping reforms. The period is therefore 
remembered as Mexico's Reform Era. The most well-known 
reformers during this time were Benito Juarez, Miguel Lerdo 
de Tejada, and Ignacio Comonfort. Under the Ley Juarez of 
1855, the Liberals suppressed all of the Church's special 
tribunals except the ecclesiastical courts.~ 
The Liberals enacted other laws to curb the power of 
the Church. The first, known as the Ley Lerdo of 1856, 
stipulated that the Church could not own property or 
buildings unless they were used specifically for religious 
services. Other Church holdings were to be sold; the 
proceeds going to the State. The law required, however, 
that the purchaser pay the Church interest equivalent to any 
rents formerly received from the property. Therefore, the 
Church maintained its wealth, but only in the form of money 
and not property.~ A later law in 1857 made the 
registration of births, marriages, adoptions, and deaths 
civil functions and no longer the prerogative of the Church. 
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In the same year, the Ley Iglesias gave the State the right 
to regulate fees for the administering of the sacraments.~ 
The Constitution of 1857 and the legislation that 
followed in 1859 and 1860 were the culmination of the 
Liberal drive to bring the Church under State control. The 
new constitution incorporated all of the various laws 
enacted during the Reform Era. For the first time in 
Mexico, a constitution did not proclaim Roman Catholicism 
the State religion, and Mexicans were given a bill of 
rights. Another unique aspect of the document was the 
requirement that all Mexicans swear an oath of allegiance to 
it. The reformers wanted the people to feel a sense of 
loyalty to the law and not to personalities such as Santa 
Anna. 31 
The new constitution eliminated all fueros. It 
secularized education, denied the civil responsibility to 
pay tithes, forbade priests from discussing politics in 
public, and made the fulfillment of monastic vows ·optional 
instead of obligatory. The Constitution also made marriage 
a civil contract and gave the government control over 
cemetaries and marriage and death records. Furthermore, 
clergymen were now forbidden to wear their clerical garb in 
public. 32 
The severity of this legislation produced a bitter 
conflict between Liberals and Conservatives that resulted in 
a civil war between 1858 and 1861 known as the Reform War. 
The Church's response to the constitution was to deny the 
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administering of the sacraments to anyone who took an oath 
of loyalty to it. When faced with a choice between their 
religion and their government, many Mexicans sided with the 
Church and were prepared to use violence to defend it.n 
The Church's response to the Constitution of 1857 
strengthened Liberal antagonism toward the clergy. Formerly 
moderate anti-clericals became radicals. Now almost all 
Liberals referred to the clergy as "anti-Mexican." 34 
The Reform War began when Conservative General Felix 
Zuloaga arrested Benito Juarez, dissolved the Congress, and 
established his own government in Mexico City. Zuloaga then 
nullified the Reform Laws and gained the support of the 
Church. Juarez later escaped and, refusing to recognize 
Zuloaga as president, established his own government in 
Veracruz. 35 
While Juarez was in Veracruz, he issued decrees that 
virtually subordinated the Church in Mexico to the State. 
In 1859, Juarez outlawed all monastic orders, secularized 
cemetaries, eliminated nunneries, nationalized all Church 
property, and restricted the number of religious holidays. 
The Reformer further outlawed the selling of Church property 
and made it illegal for government officials to participate 
in public religious functions. In 1860, Juarez established 
religious toleration in Mexico for the first time. He also 
denied the clergy the right to offer criminals asylum in 
churches, and he declared that churches must financially 
support the government when requested to do so. These laws 
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took effect when the Liberals emerged victorious in 1861 and 
Juarez was elected president.~ 
The chaotic political condition of Mexico since 
Independence had convinced many Conservatives and clerics 
that only a monarchy could restore peace and stability in 
Mexico. In 1862, with Conservative support, the French 
occupied the country; two years later Napolean III imposed 
Archduke Maximilian of Austria as Emperor of Mexico. This 
action outraged the juaristas, who once again abandoned 
Mexico City. 37 
The Emperor Maximilian, however, disappointed the 
Conservatives and the Church almost as much as he 
antagonized the Liberals. The clergy expected the Emperor 
to revoke the Reform laws and restore the Church's property, 
but at heart, Maximilian himself was a Liberal. He hoped to 
attract the support of the Mexican progressives; but in the 
process, he alienated both groups. In 1867, Napoleon III 
withdrew his military support, and the juaristas quickly 
overthrew the Emperor and executed him. Afterwards, 
Mexicans associated the Liberals with nationalism and the 
Conservatives were greatly discredited. 38 
Despite their achievements, the Liberals discovered 
that l egislation would not guarantee social change unless 
future executives were committed to enforcement. In 1876, 
Mexicans again placed their government in the hands of a 
caudillo because they were wea ry of war, political 
instability, and economic deprivation. Porfirio Diaz 
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governed Mexico as a virtual dictator for almost thirty-five 
years. Although Diaz brought economic growth and 
modernization to the country, his indifference to social 
problems and his disregard for the constitution created an 
impetus for change that ultimately led to the Mexican 
Revolution in 1910.~ 
The Diaz Era produced a xenophobia in Mexico that would 
later characterize the Revolution. To encourage economic 
development, Diaz welcomed foreign investors and gave them 
special concessions and legal privileges. Many Mexicans 
resented the favoritism that Diaz showed foreigners because 
it limited economic opportunities and produced a great 
disparity in income.~ Another reason for discontent was 
Diaz's attitude toward the Church. In order to ensure 
social harmony and to gain the Church's support, Diaz 
ignored the anti-clerical reforms of the Constitution of 
1857 and allowed the clergy virtual autonomy. One result of 
Diaz' conciliatory policy was an increase in the number of 
European, especially Spanish, priests in Mexico. This group 
became a target for persecution during the Revolution. 41 
During the first decade of the twentieth century, labor 
disputes, Indian revolts, and social protests interrupted 
the Diaz regime. Led by the Flores Mag6n brothers, a new 
generation of Liberals emerged who were more radical than 
their nineteenth century predecessors. Many of the Liberals 
were from the northern border states, where Roman 
Catholicism was not as pervasive and was influenced by 
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American Protestantism and Freemasonry. The group denounced 
the suppression of the Constitution. Individuals arose with 
political and social plans that expressed more concern for 
the poor and advocated programs of land and education 
reform. 42 
In 1911, Francisco Madero overthrew Diaz by advocating 
immediate political reforms including no reelection of the 
president. Madero, however, was slower in addressing 
Mexico's social problems. Radical Liberals demanded that 
Madero quickly implement needed changes in land 
distribution, education, and labor reform. When Madero 
failed to take action on these issues, radicals, such as 
Emiliano Zapata, rebelled against the new president.a 
Conservatives, on the other hand, wanted to restore an 
autocratic system like that of Porfirio Diaz'. These men 
feared losing their favored status because Madero hoped to 
eliminate special privileges and monopolies. Although 
Madero was not an anticlerical and had allowed the formation 
of a Catholic Party, the clergy also opposed him. They 
realized that Liberals could choose to enforce the anti-
clerical clauses of the constitution.~ 
In 1913, a conservative coalition succeeded in 
overthrowing Madero and assassinating him. An agreement 
among the conspirators placed General Victoriano Huerta in 
charge of a provisional government with an understanding 
that General F~lix Diaz would later be "elected" president. 
Huerta, however, ensured his own election by sending Diaz 
and another opponent, Federico Gamboa, out of the country 
while the voting took place.~ 
40 
Both Diaz and Gamboa had been involved in the 
conspiracy to oust Madero. Diaz was the nephew of Porfirio 
and stood as a symbol of autocracy and privilege. Gamboa 
was a famous lay Catholic novelist and diplomat. Other men 
who took part in the revolt included: Cecilia Oc6n, a 
Mexico City businessman; Aureliano Blanquet, the former 
military commander of Veracruz; and Manuel Mondrag6n, a 
federal army officer.~ During Huerta's brief 
administration, these "felicistas" became political exiles 
who eventually reunited in the United States. In July 1914, 
Venustiano Carranza, who had proclaimed himself the First 
Chief of the Constitutionalist Army, overthrew Huerta. 
While Carranza headed the government, the exiled felicistas 
staged an unsuccessful counter-revolution in 1917. In the 
process, they became acquainted with Francis Clement Kelley, 
who assisted them with their plans.G 
Kelley became interested in aiding a counter-revolt 
because some revolutionary officers and state governors had 
murdered, extorted, and exiled Mexican and foreign 
clergymen. Historian Charles C. Cumberland notes that it is 
difficult to substantiate all of the claims made by the 
Church because many of the accounts did not supply the names 
of victims and were based on "fourth-hand testimonies." 48 
However, Cumberland adds that State Department files verify 
many of the Church's claims. The files reveal that by 1914, 
persecution of clergymen was "commonplace throughout the 
regions dominated by the Constitutionalists. " 49 
The revolutionaries demanded money from the clergy, 
confiscated Church property, and exiled clerics. As 
Cumberland states, the "revolutionists mistreated the 
foreign religious, often in near-barbarous forms." 50 
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General Alvaro Obregon sentenced a bishop to eight years 
imprisonment, and in Guadalajara, "he exiled all foreign 
clerics, jailed all nationals, imposed on them a ransom of 
100,000 pesos, closed all the churches, and converted the 
bishop Is palace into a barracks. " 51 In Mexico City, Obregon 
arrested hundreds of clergymen and demanded half a million 
pesos from them. 52 
Historian Robert E. Quirk notes that Pancho Villa was 
the most anti-clerical of the revolutionary generals • 53 In 
1914, Villa executed five priests in Zacatecas.~ Witnesses 
testified that, besides executing and ransoming clergymen, 
Villa confiscated nunneries and placed brothels in them.B 
The revolutionaries offered several reasons for their 
actions against the Church. They believed that the Church 
was wealthy and, therefore, their demands for money were 
common. They particularly resented the number of foreign 
clerics in Mexico and often exiled them. Many of the 
revolutionists thought that the Church supported the 
hacendados, whom they believed contributed to Mexico's 
extreme poverty.~ The most common complaint against the 
Church, however, was that it had supported Victoriano 
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Huerta.s7 The Catholic daily El Pais had endorsed Huerta, 
while the Catholic Party and the Mexican hierarchy denounced 
the Constitutionalists.~ 
Venustiano Carranza was de facto head of the 
revolutionary government from late 1915 to 1917, then served 
as the elected president until 1920. Carranza believed in 
regulating the Church, but he was not a radical anti-
clerical. As historian Douglas Richmond notes, Carranza 
respected Mexican piety and recognized the danger in 
''provoking the religious masses."~ He only suppressed the 
Church when he believed that it was interfering in politics. 
Therefore, the First Chief expelled sixty-five foreign 
priests in October of 1914 because he thought they were 
supporting Huerta.ro Later, however, Carranza became more 
conciliatory toward the Church because he needed to 
stabilize the country and he wanted their support. In 1919, 
he allowed all of the exiled clergymen to return to 
Mexico.~ 
American Catholics were not the only group in the 
United States who opposed Carranza and the Revolution. 
United States businessmen with financial interests in Mexico 
also feared the movement. Carranza was a true nationalist 
and, beginning in 1914, issued decrees that were deemed 
socialistic and potentially damaging to foreign economic 
concerns. The First Chief hoped to reduce foreign-owned 
concessions granted during the Porfiriato. He began by 
nationalizing Mexico's railroad, telegraph, and telephone 
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systems. He then increased taxes on mining and oil 
industries. Americans affected by these measures, along 
with many Catholics in the United States, urged President 
Woodrow Wilson to deny Carranza diplomatic recognition 
unless he issued guarantees protecting foreign interests and 
the Mexican Church.~ 
Wilson was indeed reluctant to grant Carranza 
recognition. In 1914 when the revolutionary coalition 
emerged victorious over Victoriano Huerta, Carranza called 
for a convention to select a Mexican president. The result 
of this meeting, held in Aguascalientes, was a division 
between Carranza and his former allies, Emiliano Zapata and 
Pancho Villa. Carranza gained control over much of the 
country, but violence continued, some of it directed against 
Americans. 63 
From the beginning of the Revolution in 1910, Americans 
1n Mexico and along the United States border, had died as a 
result of the warfare. In 1919, the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations held hearings to investigate Mexican 
affairs. During the hearings, the State Department reported 
that it had received 73 claims of deaths since 1910. The 
Committee, however, concluded that the number of Americans 
kil l ed as a result of the Revolution was 461.~ Despite the 
absence of definite figures, the deaths alarmed the public 
and the government. 
In 1915, President Woodrow Wilson obtained certain 
guarantees from Carranza for the protection of American 
citizens and their property in Mexico. With these 
assurances, Wilson granted Carranza recognition. As a 
consequence, however, Pancho Villa reacted to the news by 
attacking Americans at Santa Isabel, Chihuahua, and 
Columbus, New Mexico, provoking the Pershing Expedition. 
United States' complaints regarding the treatment of 
Americans, their property, and their investments continued 
for many years.~ 
44 
In 1917, American investors and Catholics grew even 
more concerned when Mexico enacted a new constitution. The 
document contained articles that affected both groups' 
interests. Articles 3, 5, 27, and 130 related to the Church 
and included restrictions against Church-directed education 
and political parties with religious 'affiliations. The 
Constitution of 1917 forbade monastic orders and religious 
acts performed outside church buildings. Article 27 ~lso 
reconfirmed the Constituion of 1857's nationalization of 
Church property. It prohibited foreign priests from 
practicing in the country and granted states the right to 
regulate the number of ministers. All priests were required 
to register with civil authorities. ~ 
Thousands of American investors and property owners 
a l so had good reason to be alarmed by the new constitution. 
Article 27 gave the State the right to expropriate private 
property by nationalizing subsoil and mineral rights. 
Carranza, however, did not enforce most of the se laws. 67 
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The Mexican President did not enforce the legislation 
because he did not endorse most of it. When Carranza had 
called for a convention to meet at Queretaro in 1916, he had 
envisioned a constitution that only slightly revised the 
Constitution of 1857. The constituent congress, however, 
consisted of a majority of radical liberals who out-
maneuvered the President and his followers. The result was 
a radical document that remains in effect to the present. 68 
Tension between Church and State in Mexico subsided 
between 1918 and 1920. Beginning in the 1920s, however, the 
Church began to clash with rising reform groups. Some of 
the reformers embraced communism or socialism and were anti-
clerical. The national labor organization, Confederaci6n 
Regional Obrera Mexicana, or CROM, committed acts of 
violence against the Church. Catholics, in turn, started an 
anti-socialism campaign and organized the National Catholic 
Labor Conference.~ 
In 1923, President Alvaro Obregon (1920-1924) expelled 
the Apostolic Delegate Archbishop Ernesto Filippi because 
the cleric had violated the law by performing an outdoor 
religious ceremony dressed in his clerical robes. Obregon 
wanted to demonstrate that the government would uphold the 
law because the number of participants in the event was 
alarming. The action did not cause much dissent, however, 
because Obregon tended to ignore most other religious 
restrictions. He was principally interested in implementing 
social reforms and needed the support of the religious 
masses.w 
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American investors obtained a degree of financial 
security during Obregon's administration. After three years 
as president, Obregon finally gained dipl omatic recognition 
by agreeing to the Bucareli accords in 1923. These 
agreements stipulated that Mexico would not enforce Article 
27 of the 1917 Constitution retroactively. This arrangement 
offered Americans with oil and land investments in Mexico a 
temporary reprieve from the threat of nationalization. 11 
Plutarco Elias Calles, who was president from 1924 to 
1928, destroyed the relatively peaceful coexistence that had 
developed between the clergy and the government. The 
conciliatory Obregon had allowed a new Apostolic Delegate to 
correspond with the Vatican in code. In return, the Papacy 
promised to appoint only bishops who would avoid involvement 
in politics. Calles, an avid anti-clerical, did not 
consider himself bound by this agreement because the 
Constitution of 1917 prohibited correspondence with Rome. 
The new Mexican president intended to enforce the 
Constitution in regards to religion.n 
In 1926, the Archbishop of Mexico City, Jose Mora y del 
Rio, told a newspaper reporter that Catholics woul d not obey 
the religious restrictions of the Constitution. The State 
charged him with sedition, but later dropped the charge when 
he denied the existence of a conspiracy. Call es, howeve r, 
became fearful that the clergy was encouraging militancy, 
and, therefore, he enforced long ignored legislation. He 
ordered the expulsion of all foreign priests and enacted a 
new penal code that made anti-clerical legislation 
effective. 73 
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These new codes prohibited monasteries and nunneries 
and established fines for inducing minors to take religious 
vows. The legislation provided severe penalties for 
clergymen who engaged in political activity. The government 
was also authorized to confiscate all Church property. The 
codes further outlawed parochial schools and the use of 
religious ornamentation in any school. 74 
Calles' action led to a suspension of Church services 
by the Mexican clergy and initiated a new wave of clerical 
refugees to the United States. The Church also attempted to 
cripple the economy by asking Catholics to stage an economic 
boycott. But the most important consequence of the new laws 
was a religious revolt known as the Cristero Rebellion 
( 19 2 6 - 19 2 9 ) . 75 
In 1926, groups of peasants began to stage revolts in 
the Mexican countryside, claiming to act in the name of 
"Christ the King." The uprisings were unorganized and 
lacking in resources; in the beginning, the cri steros, as 
they were called, used "slings, sticks, and machetes. "76 
Lacking leadership and military expertise, the cristeros 
relied on sporadic guerrilla attacks. The number of 
participants eventually exceeded 50 1 000, and most of these 
were willing to be martyrs to their cause. 
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After three years of fighting, more than 90,000 
combatants were killed; the number of civilians who died as 
a result of the war is unknown. The Papacy and the Mexican 
hierarchy opposed this movement, and only five priests are 
known to have participated actively. By 1929, both sides 
knew that the war could go on indefinitely because the 
government could not curtail the cristeros' guerrilla 
activity and the Catholics were unwilling to surrender. 77 
Calles' strict adherence to the constitution brought 
into question the very nature of ecclesiastical authority. 
The Church considered its own law superior to civil or man-
made law; therefore, submission to this legislation meant, 
in essence, a denial of the Church's higher authority. 
Because the State forbade the clergy to be involved in 
politics, the Church could not legitimately defend its 
position. Protest, therefore, was left in the hands of the 
laity. 111 
Another event that intensified the conflict concerned 
the appointment of a new Apostolic Delegate. The new 
Delegate's name was Jorge I. Caruana, a naturalized American 
citizen. The Calles' administration claimed that Caruana 
had misrepresented himself when entering the country. The 
government stated that Caruana had identified himself as a 
professor because foreign clerics were forbidden in Mexico. 
The Apostolic Delegate denied these charges, but the Mexican 
government expelled him nonetheless.~ 
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The relationship between American investors and the 
Mexican government also became deeply strained during the 
Calles administration. In 1925 Mexico passed a law 
requiring all oil companies to apply to the government to 
confirm their concessions. The law also stated that, in the 
future, Mexico would only grant fifty year concessions. As 
a consequence, United States Ambassador James Sheffield, 
Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, and numerous other 
Americans, publicly denounced Calles as a "Bolshevi k. " The 
conflict became so intense that President Calvin Coolidge 
sent Ambassador Dwight w. Morrow to Mexico to "'keep us out 
of war.' "80 Morrow succeeded in concluding a compromise 
that left the application requirement intact but removed the 
fifty year limitation. 81 
In 1928, the assassination of President-elect Alvaro 
Obregon e xacerbated the religious conflict. Obregon's 
murder by a Catholic terrorist blatantly demonstrated the 
intensity of the Catholics' conviction to defy anti-clerical 
legislation. Interim President Emilio Partes Gil (1928-
1930), realized the necessity for reaching a compromise with 
the Church to end t he violence. ~ Ambassador Morrow 
also recognized this need and was instrumental in 
negotiating a modus vive ndi. 
In 1929, Morrow arranged a meeting between Calles, 
Emilio Partes Gil, and Father John J. Burke, the General 
Secreta ry of the Na t i onal Cat hol ic Welfare Confer e nce. Th e 
three men were able to reach a compromise that ended the 
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Cristero Rebellion and the suspension of Church services. 
Essentially, the agreement left the legal situation the same 
as it had been in 1926 when the conflict began. The Church 
agreed to the registration of priests, and the new penal 
code remained unchanged. The State compromised on one 
issue; it permitted the clergy to petition the government to 
amend the Constitution. The important aspect of the 
compromise was that neither side gave the appearance of 
being defeated.D 
Most violence between Church and State ended in 1929, 
but the 1930s brought a new dispute. Historian Stanley E. 
Hilton calls education the major source of conflict between 
the clergy and the government during that decade. The 
Revolutionaries realized that they must indoctrinate the 
Mexican public through education. In 1933, President 
Abelardo Rodriguez impl emented a six-year plan intended to 
socialize Mexico's education system. The following year, 
Article 3 of the Constitution was amended to require the 
teaching of socialism in primary, secondary, and normal 
schools.~ 
The Mexican hierarchy considered the action heretical 
and threatened to excommunicate any Catholic who taught 
socialism. One bishop warned Catholic parents against 
sending their children to such schools. Archbishop Pascual 
Diaz warned the public that "Bolshevism" would destroy 
religion in Mexico just as it was being destroyed in 
Russia. ~ 
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President Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940) intended to 
enforce the Constitution, but he did not want to destroy 
religion in Mexico. Cardenas was more committed to social 
reform in Mexico than any president before him. He needed 
the support of the pious lower classes to implement his 
social and economic programs. Cardenas took a conciliatory 
stance toward the Church, and most of the clerical 
opposition disappeared.~ 
The Cardenas Presidency witnessed the culmination of 
the Liberals' drive to subdue the Catholic Church in Mexico. 
Throughout Mexican history, the clergy had generally 
supported the social institutions, ideologies, and 
individuals that the Liberals opposed. As a consequence, 
Liberals placed extreme limitations upon the Church's 
political and social freedom. As Conservatives and Liberals 
alternately controlled the government, enforcement of 
repressive legislation was applied inconsistently for many 
years. Religious reformers grew progressively more radical 
as conservative administrations refused to adhere to the 
anti-clerical reforms. 
By the time of the Revolution, radicals were determined 
to render the Church submissive to State authority. They 
popularized the conception that the Revolution represented 
Mexican nationalism. The Revolution ultimately replaced 
Roman Catholicism as the country's most cohesive 
institution. It gave the nation a uniqueness and a new 
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In 1914, when Francis Clement Kelley became involved 
with the Mexican Church conflict, the Revolution was in its 
fourth year. For the next six years Kelley wrote 
continually to enlighten the American public about the 
religious persecution. He blamed Venustiano Carranza for 
the atrocities, and he encouraged the Wilson administration 
to deny him diplomatic recognition. Despite Kelley's 
efforts, Wilson extended de facto recognition to Carranza in 
October 1915. 
Between 1915 and 1917 Kelley financially assisted the 
Feliz DLaz counter-revolution in hopes of restoring the 
Church's status in Mexico. The Mexican Constitution of 1917 
heightened Kelley's concern for the Church, and he became 
convinced that the Revolution intended to destroy religion 
in Mexico. The attempted revolt failed, but in 1919, 
Carranza, who was never a radical anti-cleric, permitted the 
exiled Clergymen to return home. For the remainder of the 
Carranza administration, the governement and the Church 
coexisted 1 t ' 1 h . re a lVe y armonlously. 
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When Kelley first made the commitment to help end the 
persecution of the Mexican Church in 1914, he quickly 
acquired an important ally in Richard Henry Tierney, the 
editor of America, a Jesuit weekly published in New York 
City. Following the recognition of Carranza, Tierney 
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became highly critical of Woodrow Wilson in his editorials. 
Tierney denounced the President because he had intervened on 
Carranza's behalf to help defeat Huerta. Wilson had greatly 
facilitated Huerta's downfall by permitting arms and 
supplies to reach the anti-clerical revolutionaries.• 
Tierney was an emotional writer, and, as historian 
Dwayne Cox remarks, the formerly "lackluster" publication 
acquired "new fire" after Tierney became editor. 2 Tierney 
could be offensive in his overzealousness, and he made many 
enemies during the crusade. As Dwayne Cox further notes, 
Tierney managed to "earn the contempt" of the Masons, the 
Red Cross, and the American Federation of Labor. The editor 
denounced the Masons because he believed they encouraged the 
persecution of Catholics in Mexico; he was critical of the 
AFL for endorsing Carranza. Tierney also faulted the Red 
Cross because he thought they showed a lack of concern for 
Catholic refugees. 3 In spite of these tirades against 
opponents, Pope Benedict XV commended both Tierney and 
Kelley for their efforts regarding the Mexican Church. 4 
In September 1914, Tierney attended the Annual 
Convention of the American Federation of Catholic Societies 
and helped write a letter of protest to Secretary of State 
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William Jennings Bryan. Bryan asked for a specific set of 
grievances, and Tierney prepared a detailed list of the 
atrocities and requested that the government intervene to 
stop the persecution. Bryan and the President replied that 
Catholics were simply unaware of the administration's 
efforts, and Wilson assured the Federation that he was doing 
all that he could. 5 
The President did not think that intervention was 
justifiable in the Mexican Church/State conflict. Both he 
and Bryan sent letters to Carranza, cautioning him against 
the ill effects of negative world opinion, but that was as 
far as Wilson was willing to pursue the matter. He did not 
believe that the United States should defend Mexican 
nationals or Europeans. Wilson's primary concern in regards 
to Mexico was the protection of American lives and property. 
Despite Catholic appeals, the President remained adamant on 
this point. 6 
In November 1914, an article appeared in Extension 
entitled "Where the Gates of Hell are Open." This article 
by Kelley exemplified his approach to both enlightening the 
public and soliciting contributions. The piece began with 
Kelley's appeal to his readers' emotions. As he related 
incidents of persecution against Mexican clergymen, his 
sorrow and anger were evident. Kelley stated that "he could 
not use words plain enough to tell the vileness." He spoke 
of exiles "crowded into cattle cars, confined in dungeons, 
'insulted, reviled, [and] spit upon' like their Master." 
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The stories of the nuns, he said, were "too horrible to 
tell." If Madero's death required vengeance, Kelley asked, 
"did it need rivers of better blood than ever flowed in his 
apostate veins, oceans of tears, and sin enough to glut the 
very gates of hell?" 7 
Kelley appealed for donations by implying that it was 
the United States' fault that the atrocities were taking 
place because this country had aided the overthrow of 
Huerta. He inquired, 11 Who is to blame?.. His answer was: 
"Ourselves!" Kelley said that "Whoever did the work was a 
representative of the American people." He added that the 
Extension Society could use any donation the reader could 
offer; even five cents would be appreciated to heal the 
"wounds for which we are so largely responsible." 8 
His methods offended Wilson and perhaps explain the 
cool reception that Kelley received from William Jennings 
Bryan when the Secretary agreed to meet with him in early 
1915. Bryan inquired if Kelley was editor of Extension and 
if this "had anything to do with a political campaign? " 9 
Bryan was probably referring to the fact that in December of 
1914, Kelley had given Theodore Roosevelt information from 
his affidavits to use in a newspaper article that denounced 
Wilson's Mexican policy. 10 
Kelley did not forget the matter. In February, Kelley 
wrote an article regarding the Catholic Party in Mexico. He 
explained the party's platform, which espoused liberty of 
conscience, honest elections, a free press, and parental 
rights. Kelley asked, "How do you, Mr. American Citizen, 
like them?" He said that these ideals were dead in Mexico 
because "the American people •.. helped to kill [them]." 
Kelley added that only a churchman could restore them. 
Evidently he believed that the Revolution had destroyed 
these human rights in Mexico and that the Catholic Party 
would reestablish them. 11 
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Despite Kelley's hostility toward Wilson, the President 
agreed to grant the cleric an interview. Wilson was much 
warmer than his Secretary of State had been, and he talked 
with Kelley for quite some time. Wilson explained his own 
views of the Revolution and discussed the need for land 
reform in Mexico. He told Kelley that some good might 
eventually emerge from all the bloodshed just as it had in 
France following the French Revolution. Apparently Wilson 
considered Mexico's economic problems more urgent than the 
question of religious freedom. 12 Many years later Kelley 
would say that Wilson only "half-loved" the principle of 
"freedom of conscience." He was never a great admirer of 
Wilson. 13 
As a result of this meeting, Wilson promised Kelley a 
letter that would outline the administration's policy and 
its concern for the Mexican Church. The President said that 
Bryan would send Kelley this statement as soon as possible; 
Kelley, however, suggested having it published in the press 
instead. The promised letter appeared in the New York Times 
on April 22. 14 
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Bryan, speaking for the President, stated that the 
administration was concerned about the Catholics in Mexico. 
He noted, however, that that country's problems could only 
be settled by an improvement in its economy through land 
reform and, following that, by education. The Secretary 
added that the United States must act only in the role of a 
"friend and advisor." Bryan quoted from a message that he 
had sent to both Villa and Carranza in July 1914. At that 
time, he told the revolutionaries that "[n]othing will shock 
the civilized world more than . vindictive action toward 
priests or ministers." Bryan also warned them that "the 
treatment already said to have been accorded priests has had 
a most unfortunate effect upon opinion outside of Mexico." 
He concluded by informing the Mexicans that religious 
freedom would be one point that the United States would 
consider in determining recognition. 15 
This threat was what Kelley and many others had 
desired. Catholics from around the country mailed letters 
to the President insisting on this course of action. Wilson 
received letters from almost every United States' bishop, 
the Federation of Catholic Societies, the Catholic Truth 
Society, the Knights of Columbus, the Catholic Women's 
League, the Conference of Catholic Charities, and the 
Ladies' Catholic Benevolent Association. 16 
In mid-1915, the President was still undecided about 
recognizing Carranza. Carranza had issued statements 
assuring Wilson that he would respect the freedom of 
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religion as long as the Church operated within the limits of 
the law. Later in the year, Wilson asked a hemispheric 
conference on United States-Latin American Affairs to offer 
a recommendation concerning recognition. Six Latin American 
nations, including Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, unanimously 
concluded that Carranza should be recognized; as a result, 
Wilson granted the First Chief de facto recognition on 
October 19, 1915 . 17 
Arthur s. Link points out that "the effect of the 
Catholic campaign at home [had been], if anything, to harden 
(the administration's) determination to proceed" with 
recognition. Wilson was aware that most Protestants as well 
as organized labor would support his action. Reporters were 
told "that the administration was satisfied with Carranza's 
promises of religious freedom and . . • that Mexican priests 
who entered politics must expect to be treated like 
politicians. " 18 
The President's action produced a profound and lasting 
effect on Kelley. He would forever feel bitter toward 
Wilson, and, in fact, later he would try to prevent the 
President's reelection. In spite of his immense 
disappointment over this action, Kelley built a seminary for 
the Mexican exiles in Castroville, Texas. Former Mexican 
professors taught at the school, and it remained in 
operation for three years. One of its students later became 
a bishop . 19 
65 
Kelley became more convinced that Protestants and 
Masons were determined to destroy the Mexican Church. 
According to historian Douglas Richmond, Masons and 
Protestants did encourage the persecution. In the Book of 
Red and Yellow, Kelley had accused anti-Catholic Protestants 
in the United States of spreading propaganda through the 
mail. In Extension, Kelley expressed his bitterness over 
the appointment in Mexico of a Protestant to oversee the 
YMCA there. He was disturbed by the assignment of a 
Protestant for a nation that was 98 percent Catholic.w 
Kelley was just as concerned about Masons. He told 
Tierney that he was not sure "just how deep American Masons" 
were involved in the Revolution, but that there was "some 
influence keeping the facts from the people. " 21 Tierney was 
also convinced of this. He informed Kelley that "American 
masons helped in the . revolution by arms and 
ammunition" and that he could provide "the name of the 
American agent" and his address. 22 In 1917, when Kelley 
realized that no Catholics had been promoted to general in 
the United States Army, he remarked that "[t]he influence of 
the square and compass • is very strong."23 
The two crusaders also faulted the American Federation 
of Labor (AFL) for endorsing Carranza. In the September 
1916 issue of Extension, Kelley said that the AFL had 
endorsed a "looting, thieving, murdering band that has 
destroyed religion in Mexico."u The General Secretary of 
the AFL, Frank Duffy, was a Catholic. Kelley wrote to him 
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several times to protest the organization's support for the 
Mexican government and the Mexican labor movement known as 
Casa del Obrero Mundial, or House of the World's Worker. 25 
Duffy told Kelley that he first became aware of the 
organization's actions when he read about them in the 
Chicago Daily Tribune. He, in turn, protested to AFL 
President Samuel Gompers.~ The Chicago newspaper had 
claimed that Carranza hoped to prevent American intervention 
by forming an alliance with the federation. 27 Kelley 
offered to send all AFL Executive Council members a copy of 
the Book of Red and Yellow.~ 
Some groups and individuals in the United States 
thought that Americans had no right to interfere in the 
internal affairs of Mexico. A number of Catholics even 
disliked what Kelley and Tierney were trying to do. A few 
of Kelley's readers asked why the bishops had left Mexico 
instead of staying and fighting. One man from Rhinelander, 
Wisconsin, told Kelley that "when the Bishops Peter and Paul 
and James were persecuted they did not flee to a friendly 
country. "29 
Dr. John W. Butler of the Protestant Missionaries in 
Mexico City blamed the atrocities on forces outside 
Carranza's control. In an article for Current Opinion, he 
said that outrages were committed by "irresponsible mobs or 
degenerate soldiers, condemned alike by Mexicans of all 
faiths and revolutionary factions." 30 Tierney told Kelley 
that a Reverend Edward Flannery in the Hartford Times had 
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written "a long, a mean and an absolutely inconclusive 
attack on you and me." In another letter, Tierney said that 
"some of the clergy are not keenly on our side" and that he 
was getting some "vigorous letters of protest against [his ) 
attitude. "31 
Many publications across the country also defended 
Wilson's Mexican policy and objected to any kind of American 
intervention over the issue. Carranza even had his own 
propaganda publication in the United States called the 
Mexican Review. The two most prominent American magazines 
supporting the Mexican president were The Nation and The 
New Republic. Most Protestant missions also favored the 
Revolution, including the Methodists, Presbyterians, and 
Quakers. Although they did not condone the violence, these 
publications insisted that one could understand the 
persecution of the Mexican Church only after becoming aware 
of Mexico's historical experience with Catholicism.n 
American ~atholics predominantly opposed the aims and 
measures of the Constitutionalists, but some remained 
neutral and considered religious conflicts Mexico's concern. 
One such Catholic was Joseph P. Tumulty, President Wilson's 
personal secretary. Tumulty was loyal to his employer and 
did not allow his religious affiliation to interfere with 
his professional obligations. On November 29, 1915, the 
President's secretary issued a press release that became 
known as the "Tumulty Letter." 33 
In this statement Tumulty expressed the 
administration's reasons for recognizing Venustiano 
Carranza. The Secretary began by citing historical 
precedence. He claimed that President James Buchanan had 
recognized Benito Juarez while being well aware of the 
reformer's liberal legislation. Those laws were the same 
ones currently under dispute with the Mexican Church. 
Presumably, the administration did not want United States 
Mexican policy to be inconsistent.~ 
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Tumulty listed three more points. He began by citing 
the agreement among six Latin American countries that 
recognition of Carranza was desirable. Next, the Secretary 
explained that Carranza had a loyal following. The United 
States had sent a series of telegrams to "all generals, 
governors, and leaders of factions." These men were asked 
to attend a discussion to reach a "peaceful settlement of 
their differences." As a result, all of the villistas 
replied independently and agreed to meet. The carrancistas, 
however, all referred the matter to their leader--indicating 
to the Americans a solidarity in Carranza's camp. The final 
factor was Carranza's guarantee to allow freedom of 
worship.~ 
The Turnulty statement concluded by adding that the 
administration could not substantiate the reports of 
atrocities toward Mexican nuns. The Secretary stated that 
"there [were] no official record[s] of a single proven case 
of this dastardly crime in the files of the Department of 
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State." He went on to say that the Vicar General of Mexico 
city, Antonio J. Paredes, could not substantiate any 
violation of nuns. Turnulty quoted Paredes as follows: "'I 
have been unable to confirm the rumors that violated nuns 
have arrived in this capital from other places.'" 36 
When Francis Clement Kelley read the administration's 
remarks, he exploded in anger and frustration. In a letter 
to the editor of the Rock Island Argus in Illinois, Kelley 
explained that Paredes had been appointed by Carranza and, 
therefore, the veracity of his statements was highly 
questionable. Kelley referred to Turnulty's remarks as 
"misstatements . • • being published throughout the 
country." He added that if State Department files did not 
"contain any record of outrages to nuns and persecution of 
priests and religious," it was "because such records [had] 
not been allowed to get into the files." "No doubt," he 
said ·"these representations themselves are masons, 
representing anti-Catholic governments." Kelley described 
the letter as "rot" and accused Turnulty of "selling his 
birthright. "37 
In a letter to Richard Tierney, Kelley remarked, "It 
was the most foolish thing that Wilson ever did." Referring 
to the upcoming election, he went on to say that: 
"It is my judgement that that one letter has lost 
[Wilson) hundreds of thousands of votes already, 
and I am afraid it puts an end to poor Tumulty, 
who I am convinced, never wrote a line of it."38 
Kelley also told a Washington attorney that the letter 
"practically calls the author of the Book of Red and Yellow 
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a falsifier." Tierney suggested that one of the bishops 
make a public statement because it was "high time that these 
men appreciated what we have done for them. "39 
During this trying time, Kelley carried out his most 
militant and controversial actions. He joined Senator 
Albert B. Fall, Theodore Roosevelt, and former Mexican 
Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson in publicly denouncing Woodrow 
Wilson's Mexican policy. Kelley also attended the 
Republican Convention in Chicago in 1916 and used Extension 
to endorse candidate Charles Evans Hughes. He wrote the 
editor of the Queen's Work that "If Mr. Hughes ·wins, I have 
reason to believe that Carranza will fall at once." 40 
An article in Extension warned the Democrats of the 
consequences in alienating the Catholic vote. Kelley said 
that "[i]t is a danger to the prosperity of several 
thousands of densely ignorant bigots south of the Mason and 
Dixon line, who now and then ride into power on the back of 
a long-eared northern jackass."M He blasted Wilson in an 
article the following month, saying that the President was 
"at heart • . a parlor socialist. "42 Another time, he 
stated that "[t]here isn't a nasty little revolutionist in 
the world we have not patted on the back." Wilson's 
actions, Kelley said, caused the world to view the United 
States as "meddlesome mischief-makers." 43 In another 
instance, he called Wilson's policy "weak" and 
"conscienceless," and he state d that "it is (a] sign of 
degradation that many are found to champion it." 44 
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Kelley's criticism of Wilson was inconsistent at this 
point. On one hand, he wanted Wilson to intervene in Mexico 
for the sake of religious freedom, but, on the other hand, 
he denounced the president for being "meddlesome." Kelley 
had been highly critical when Wilson had helped Carranza 
overthrow Huerta. Kelley favored intervention against the 
revolutionary government but not against conservatives who 
favored the Church. 
Kelley told Tierney that he was aware of "the danger of 
being pulled into politics over [the] Mexican situation." 
He claimed that he did not want to see "an anti-Catholic 
campaign" but that the Democrats could not afford to lose 
the Catholic vote. Kelley stressed that the emphasis should 
be on the "religious liberty issue" and that they must 
insist that it was "not an exclusively Catholic question."~ 
During this time, many Americans thought that Mexican 
society was becoming socialistic. Labor organizations 
emerged, the most important being the radical Casa del 
Obrero Mundial. Carranza had also nationalized Mexico's 
railroads, telegraphs, and telephones. Although the 
Carranza government did exhibit socialist tendencies, in 
actuality, the Mexican president was motivated more by 
sentiments of nationalism than socialism.~ 
In 1916, Kelley sent a letter to the Catholic clergy of 
the United States regarding Mexican socialism. He stated 
that he considered it his duty to inform them "as to just 
what [was] going on." Kelley did not indicate where any 
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"new" information was coming from, but he claimed that, 
"Recent happenings absolutely prove[d] that the 
Constitutionalists propose[d] to destroy the Church root and 
branch." Kelley informed the clergy that "Socialism · 
is in the saddle now." He further stated that "the 
Industrial Workers of the World have received many Catholic 
buildings." The "question" he added, is one "of saving the 
Catholic Church in a whole nation. "47 
Kelley's and Tierney's militancy alienated more 
Catholics. One Extension subscriber complained to Kelley 
about a pamphlet he had received entitled "Wilson, Gompers, 
and Carranza." The man wanted to know if he had been sent 
the pamphlet because he was Catholic. He thought that it 
had been mailed to Catholics to "[create] hostility [toward] 
President Wilson." 48 Another man from Los Angeles told 
Kelley that "Protestants say we are against labor." This 
same person wanted to know why Catholics were opposed to 
socialism when it was a system designed to distribute 
wealth. 49 These types of responses probably prompted Kelley 
to remark in Extension that the fight would continue; if 
some people did not approve, they had the option of "lumping 
it. 1150 
Kelley's anti-Wilson campaign came to an abrupt halt 
when Montana Senator Thomas J. Walsh, member of the 
Democratic National Committee , sent a letter of protest to 
George Wil lian Mundelein, the Archbishop o f Chicago. Walsh, 
a Roman Catholic, was blunt and firm in criticizing the 
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September issue of Extension for its endorsement of Hughes. 
He threatened to make Kelley's anti-Wilson campaign a 
political issue if the Church persisted in "trying to 
control the government." The senator accused the magazine 
of becoming "a partisan journal." Mundelein immediately 
informed Kelley of Walsh's complaints, and the articles 
ceased. 51 
Although Wilson won the election, the Catholic campaign 
had an effect, especially in Indiana, where the President 
lost the state. Wilson biographer, Arthur S. Link, claims 
that Kelley had an important influence on the Catholic vote 
and that The Book of Red and Yellow made a definite impact. 
Many American Catholics felt that Wilson was unconcerned 
about the plight of the Mexican Church.n 
The President was perplexed over the Catholics' 
defiance. He could not understand why Catholics criticized 
his position on Mexico and his belief that the United States 
had no right to interfere in another nation's internal 
politics. He attributed much of their animosity to Kelley. 
After the election, Wilson informed Tumulty that any 
requests from Kelley were to be '"simply • overlooked, 
not only as far as I am concerned but so far as members of 
the Cabinet are concerned."' Kelley later told Bishop 
William T. Russell that he was "a persona non grata at the 
White House. 1!53 
President Wilson had another reason to dislike Kelley. 
Kelley's biographer, James Gaffey, notes that Wilson 
suspected Kelley and the exiled Mexican bishops of 
supporting a counter-revolutionary named Eduardo Iturbide. 
rturbide had been the Huertista governor of the Federal 
District, and some Catholic clergymen favored him as 
president. Gaffey, however, believes that there is 
insufficient evidence to support the President's 
accusation. 54 
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There are, however, incriminating statements in 
Kelley's correspondence that indicate that he did aid 
General Felix DLaz in his attempt to overthrow Carranza. It 
will be recalled that Felix DLaz, along with Cecilia Oc6n, 
Manuel Mondragon, and Federico Gamboa, were accomplices in 
the Huertista revolt that succeeded in ousting Francisco 
Madero. Beginning in 1914, Kelley began negotiating with 
these conspirators, who were now plotting a counter-revolt 
from New Orleans. In a letter to the Society of American 
Bishops the following year, Kelley said that, "Our work has 
been to secure pledges from different parties which will 
become operative in case the members of these parties come 
into power" and "to work up such sentiment amongst Catholics 
of the United States as will insure the government 
assisting. " 55 This explanation for Kelley's actions, 
however, is not entirely in keeping with the evidence at 
hand. Several statements in his own correspondence reveal 
that his involvement went deeper than he indicated to the 
American bishops. 
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In December of 1914, Colonel J. A. Robertson, a wealthy 
rancher and businessman from Texas, wrote a letter of 
introduction for Kelley to Felix Diaz. The colonel told 
Diaz that Kelley "comes to you • . • for the good of the 
fatherland." On the same day, Robertson also framed a 
letter of introduction for Thomas v. Shannon to the same 
general. Father Shannon was the editor of the New World, a 
Catholic weekly in Chicago. He was also a close personal 
friend of Kelley. ln his letter, Robertson described 
Shannon as "a friend of the cause for which you are so 
valiantly battling." This was the beginning of an 
association between the two priests and several of the 
Mexican counter-revolutionists.~ 
A few weeks after these introductory letters were 
written, Robertson contacted Daniel Guggenheim, owner of the 
American Smelting and Refining Company. Guggenheim held 
vast interests in Mexico. Again, Robertson introduced 
Kelley and informed Guggenheim that the Monsignor would "lay 
before you certain plans whereby powerful influences may be 
brought about to effect a settlement of the troubles now 
existing in Mexico." Other wealthy American investors, such 
as Oscar J. Braniff and J.I. McCullough, would also become 
friends of Kelley in the months to follow. 57 
Dwayne Cox notes that Richard Tierney endorsed both 
Eduardo Iturbide and Felix Diaz. The author says that 
Tierney's associates encouraged Diaz to appoint Federico 
Gamboa to an important post if the general succeeded in 
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becoming Mexico's president. It should be recalled that 
Gamboa had been the candidate of the Catholic Party in 1913. 
"In the meantime," Cox adds, "sympathetic Americans were 
recruited to help Diaz mind his affairs." About this time 
Kelley wrote to Tierney and said he had been "advised of the 
new movement and saw the gentleman in New Orleans. He is 
perfectly willing to give guarantees as to religious 
liberty." Kelley does not mention the "gentleman's" name, 
but New Orleans was the headquarters for many of the 
collaborators, including F~lix Diaz.~ 
In the early part of 1915, Colonel Robertson wrote that 
there were rumors that the United States government was 
"shadowing" Kelley. 59 This "shadowing" did indeed happen. 
Between 1915 and 1917, no fewer than four agents of the 
Department of Justice's Bureau of Investigation and one 
United States Consul to Mexico reported that both Shannon 
and Kelley were securing funds for F~lix Diaz's movement. 
Reports indicate that Cecilia Ocon was appointed Diaz's 
"lawful attorney •.. for the purpose of collecting the 
necessary funds to carry on the plans of the" movement. The 
group included Manuel Mondragon, Aureliano Blanquet, Ramon 
Diaz, and Pedro del Villar, Diaz' personal agent. Ramon 
Diaz was an intimate friend of Colonel J.A. Robertson.~ 
Both Villar and Ocon reportedly negotiated with Kelley 
for financial backing from the International Harvester 
Company and Wrigley Chewing Gum Company. The harvester 
company expected to obtain exclusive rights to the sisal 
industry in the Yucatan if Felix Diaz succeeded in gaining 
control of Mexico. Wrigley hoped to acquire the same 
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In January of 1916, Tierney told Kelley that he 
believed the United States government had begun its 
"defense." He stated that the secret service had been 
"nosing about" but that they would not find "anything 
against the American Catholics" because there was "nothing 
to be found." It appears that Tierney did not know about 
Kelley's financial transactions. Kelley replied that any 
77 
accusations involving Felix Diaz were unfounded. He stated 
that Diaz had "called on" him two or three times but that he 
had assured the felicistas that the Church did not want to 
be involved in revolutions.~ 
Evidently Archbishop Farley was informed of the 
accusations because Kelley wrote him a letter of explanation 
in February. He told Farley that he had been "approached" 
by three men: Felix Diaz, a Zapata representative, and 
Oc6n. This account was somewhat misleading because Kelley 
obviously initiated a meeting with Diaz, as evidenced by his 
letter of introduction from J.A. Robertson. In his letter 
to Farley, Kelley also mentioned a press interview in which 
Cardinal Gibbons repeated a statement that Kelley had made 
to him earlier. Kelley had told Gibbons that "neither Villa 
nor Carranza would be the man to bring peace to Mexico, but 
that some stronger man would arise out of the difficulty 
later on." During the interview, Gibbons quoted Kelley on 
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this, and some people had taken the statement as evidence 
that Catholic clergymen had knowledge of a proposed counter-
revolt; obviously they were right.~ 
The matter seems to have subsided for almost a year, 
until Tierney received a letter in October 1916 from a 
Joachim Amor. Arnor informed the editor that Cecilio Oc6n 
told a Diaz representative in New York that Kelley and 
Shannon of Chicago had obtained a one million dollar loan 
for General Diaz. Amor also informed Tierney that the 
supposed lender was "Wrigley." A letter from Colonel 
Robertson to Kelley about this same time stated that "if the 
needful facilities reach Gen'l Diaz [sic] in reasonable 
time, I feel sure most excellent results may be expected." 
The Colonel went on to say that the "powerful aid and 
untiring efforts of Father Shannon" would be appreciated by 
the people of Mexico. Despite these incriminating 
statements, Kelley reasured Tierney that he had "no 
connection in any way, shape or manner with Mexican 
revolutions." 64 
In October 1916, Arnor told Tierney that Oc6n claimed 
that $900,000 had been sent to Guatemala. Diaz planned to 
invade Mexico from Guatemala and had discussed the project 
with Guatemalan President, Manuel Estrada Cabrera. An 
undated letter to Arnor from a Mr. "Tridon" said the Oc6n 
story was absolutely true and that $500,000 had been sent to 
"our friend Felix [sic]." He said that Wrigley owned the 
chicle company and headed the syndicate to raise the cash. 
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The man who had gotten everything together was Father 
Shannon. 65 
About one year later, in January 1918, Kelley informed 
Tierney that the "people in New York" were angry about 
something concerning Federico Gamboa and General Diaz. He 
mentioned that one of his "clerical friends [probably 
Shannon]" had "helped very materially" someone associated 
with the conspirators. Tierney reported that Kelley's 
"very intimate clerical [friend] in Chicago" had been 
' 
writing letters to New York that were upsetting associates 
of Felix Diaz. Diaz claimed that their "cause" was "being 
betrayed. " 66 
Following these remarkable exchanges, Tierney and 
' 
Kelley began using the initials G. {probably Gamboa) and 0. 
(probably Oc6n) in their letters. Tierney informed Kelley 
that New York was upset because 0. was considered "a 
consurnate rascal" and "a very dangerous man." Presumably, 
the "people in New York" referred to the Catholic hierarchy. 
It should be recalled that Cecilia Oc6n was implicated in 
the assassination of Francisco Madero, and in fact, the 
Bureau of Investigation reported that he was "the man who 
had Gustavo Madero [brother of the President] assassinated." 
Tierney goes on to say that "as to G. New York believes that 
he is not reliable or representative. Firstly because he 
did not sever his connection with Masons ... [s]econdly 
because he wrote an immoral novel." He adds that "[t]here 
are other things concerning the matter which I do not care 
to commit to writing." Tierney ends by say1.ng that "your 
clerical friend is I feel making a grave mistake." 0 
Kelley's response to this information was that he had 
seen Shannon, who had admitted to writing one letter. 
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Kelley added that, "He soaked me a good hard one when I 
spoke about F. G. saying he must be acceptable to Catholics 
since he was nominated for President of Mexico by the 
Catholic party and elected." Kelley ended by saying that 
Shannon believed in 0. C. (Cecilio Oc6n?] and F. G. 
(Federico Gamboa] but that he had "lost interest to a great 
extent." Kelley asked Tierney to relay this information to 
New York. 68 
This exchange concludes discussion of the subject in 
Kelley's correspondence. Kelley had claimed that he only 
sought to obtain guarantees of religious freedom from 
prospective Mexican presidents. His letters, however, 
demonstrate that he initiated an introduction to Felix Diaz, 
while he told his superiors that he had been "approached" by 
the Mexican general. One of his closest friends, Richard 
Tierney, was informed personally by members of the Mexican 
movement that Kelley and Shannon had obtained money from 
American businessmen. Although Kelley denied the 
accusations, his associate Colonel Robertson wrote him that 
he expected a good outcome for General Diaz if the "needful 
facilities" were delivered on time. Robertson could have 
been referring only to either money or arms. Later Kelley 
told Tierney that his "clerical friend in Chicago" helped 
81 
the movement "very materially." Lastly, it is obvious that 
Kelley and Tierney were involved in something secretive when 
they began using initials to hide the identities of Oc6n and 
Gamboa. 
Historian Peter Henderson notes that the felicistas did 
stage an unsuccessful revolt in 1917. Afterwards, Felix 
Diaz joined another revolutionary, Manuel Pelaez, in 
extorting American oil companies in Veracruz . The two 
obtained money by offering protection for American interests 
there.@ Kelley ended his association with Diaz and the 
other felicistas when it became obvious that the State 
Department and others suspected him of engaging in illegal 
activities. His interest in the matter continued, however, 
and was especially piqued when Mexico enacted the 
Constitution of 1917 that included severe restrictions 
against the Church. 
American businessmen were also concerned about the 
constitution because it threatened their financial interests 
in Mexico. They united in an effort to protect their 
property and investments. The group hoped to incite 
intervention by dramatizing atrocities perpetrated against 
American citizens in Mexico. 70 
In 1918, one businessman who attempte d to p r ovoke 
intervention was Edward L. Doheny. Doheny, one of the 
largest investors in Mexican oil production, planned to pay 
various professors to investigate social and political 
conditions in Mexico. Kelley became distressed when he 
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discovered the plan because no Catholics had been selected 
to participate in the work. Tierney informed him that it 
was probably better that Protestants complete the reports 
because he had complete control over the religious aspect of 
the investigation. Obviously, Doheny intended the project 
to be sympathetic to the Church and critical of Carranza. A 
letter from "C. Fitzgerald" of the Sonora Investment Company 
to Tierney clarifies the plan. Fitzgerald wrote that "the 
real and only reason for the entire thing is TO GET CARRANZA 
[capitals in original]," and that Doheny wanted to encourage 
"peaceful intervention."n 
In 1919, New Mexico Senator Albert B. Fall initiated 
another effort to raise public interest. The senator had 
once owned mining property in Mexico and still maintained 
friendships with important Mexican landowners and several 
American businessmen who had large investments there. Fall 
introduced a resolution into the Senate for an investigation 
of Mexican affairs. A subcommittee of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations heard the testimonies of 257 witnesses, 
including Francis Clement Kelley and his friend Eber Cole 
Byam. Byam, a businessman who had lived in Mexico for 
twelve years, later collaborated with Kelley to write the 
lengthy history of Mexico entitled Blood-Drenched Altars.n 
Kelley explained his connection to the exiled Mexican 
clergymen and then gave the subcommittee his analysis of 
the Mexican political and social situation. He told the 
members of the committee that he had collected over $75,000 
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to aid the exiled Mexican clerics. He blamed most of the 
problems in that country on anti-clericalism. He stated 
that Mexicans believed that Americans hated Catholicism, 
and, therefore, they persecuted the Church in order to 
appeal to the United States. As to the accusations he had 
heard that Mexico was "priest-ridden," he noted that the 
country had a ratio of 1 priest per 3000 people, whereas in 
the United States, the ratio of ministers (other than 
Catholic) was 1 to 153 people.n 
Eber Cole Byam's testimony supported Kelley's. Byarn 
had lived in Mexico from 1895 to 1907 and believed that 
Huerta had been Mexico's best hope for peace and prosperity. 
He labeled the leaders of the current revolution 
"sociaiists" and stated that the fundamental cause of the 
violence and lawlessness in Mexico was "anti-clericalism. " 74 
In its final recommendations, the Fall Committee 
Hearings made two points. First, the subcommittee advised 
the administration to deny recognition to Mexican 
governments that did not respect American property rights in 
Mexico and suggested that United States property be exempted 
from Article 27. The final point stipulated that the United 
States should "reserve the prerogative of intervention" if 
future violations occurred.u 
The outcome of the hearings was predictable given the 
views of Senator Fall and most of the witnesses. Woodrow 
Wilson probably was not surprised by its recommendations, 
and he refused to be coerced into intervention. The 
President simply killed the resolution and informed Fall 
that it was the responsibility of the Chief Executive to 
determine America's policy towards Mexico.u The Fall 
hearings did not attract much public interest. Americans 
were generally weary of conflict, having just emerged from 
the War in Europe, and events in Mexico were of iittle 
concern to them.n 
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Many Americans believed that millionaires and Catholic 
clergymen were conspiring to provoke intervention for purely 
selfish reasons. Woodrow Wilson was particularly sensitive 
to this type of intimidation, and he resented it. In 1919, 
he gave an address in which he bitterly stated that "I 
learned what I know about Mexico • . . by hearing a large 
number of liars tell me all about it." Many Catholics, 
including Kelley and Tierney, believed that his remarks were 
directed at them. They were probably correct; but people 
such as Albert B. Fall and Edward L. Doheny were most likely 
on the President's mind as well.n 
Even some of the exiled archbishops began to suspect 
that oil companies were using Catholics to further their own 
financial interests. The clerics spoke out around the 
country and encouraged American Catholics to be patient. 
They were cautious during this time because conditions had 
changed in Mexico, and there was a strong possibility that 
they would be allowed to go home. The archbishops did not 
want public criticism to endanger that opportunity; their 
caution proved to be wise.~ 
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Late in 1919, Venustiano Carranza permitted the exiled 
clergymen to return home. For the remainder of his 
administration, Carranza left the Church alone; in fact, 
just before leaving office, he appealed to the Mexican 
Congress to amend Article 130 to allow religious freedom. 
One reason that Carranza became friendlier to the Church was 
to weaken the popular support of opponents such as Felix 
Diaz. 80 
Kelley had his own opinion of Carranza's change in 
attitude. In 1935, he wrote that Carranza finally had 
realized that suppression of the Church was detrimental to 
the welfare of the country. He believed that Carranza had 
come to appreciate the value of Catholic education and 
social influence. In the end, Kelley spoke highly of the 
former president for his efforts to curtail the severity of 
revolutionary anti-clericalism. 81 
The first six years of Kelley's campaign to end 
persecution of the Mexican Church were counterproductive. 
The United States did not adopt a policy of recognition that 
excluded leaders who refused to guarantee religious freedom. 
Kelley's efforts to fund a conservative counter-revolution 
also met with failure. Furthermore, his criticism of 
Woodrow Wilson and his involvement in the election o f 1916 
alienated the President and many other Americans as well. 
In the future, he would be careful not to involve himself in 
politics. 
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CHAPTER V 
PROPAGANDA, RESIGNATION, AND BLOOD-
DRENCHED ALTARS, 1920-1935 
Despite his revised opinion of Venustiano Carranza, 
Francis Clement Kelley continued to denounce the Mexican 
government until 1935. President Alvaro Obregon (1920-1924) 
was conciliatory toward the Church, but President Plutarco 
Elias Calles (1924-1928) enforced the Constitution's anti-
clerical legislation. As a result, between 1926 and 1929, 
religious zealots staged a revolt known as the Cristero 
Rebellion. During this time Kelley became convinced that 
Mexico's government was communist. He attempted to 
persuade the American public that Mexican presidents were 
"Bolsheviks" and that foreign businesses should not invest 
in Mexico. Kelley hoped to coerce Mexican presidents into 
allowing religious freedom by disseminating negative 
propaganda. By 1935, however, it would became evident to . 
Kelley that Mexico would never revoke the anti-clerical 
provisions of the Constitution of 1917. At that time, he 
concluded his involvement with Mexico's Church/State 
conflict by writing Blood-Drenched Altars. 
The 1920s began relatively peacefully in Mexico. Only 
one incident marred the otherwise cooperative spirit between 
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Obregon's government and the Church. That event, the 
expulsion of Archbishop Ernesto Filippi in 1923, did not 
produce a major conflict. The archbishop had performed a 
religious ceremony outdoors while wearing his clerical 
robes; clearly, he had violated the Mexican constitution. 
Obregon generally allowed the Church a great deal of 
latitude because he was more interested in restoring the 
country's devastated economy. In this particular instance, 
however, public attendance at the event was so great that 
Obregon believed he must enforce the law. 1 
Francis Kelley attempted to arouse anger over the 
expulsion of Filippi, but he did not have much success. He 
told a friend that "the Obregon Government lost its 
protection from criticism on our part" when it expelled the 
archbishop. 2 Kelley was convinced that the Mexican 
government intended to eradicate religion in Mexico 
altogether. In Extension, Kelley wrote that Mexico teaches 
"us about what we may expect if we nurse hooded cobras."3 
He did not provoke much sympathy, though, as Americans had 
lost interest in Mexico's religious disputes. 4 
Although it might appear that Kelley's public efforts 
on behalf of the Mexican Church waned in the 1920s, he was 
still intimately involved. After his appointment as Bishop 
of Oklahoma in 1924, his new duties and obligations 
prevented him from devoting as much time to the problem. As 
previously noted, he also lost control of Extension 
magazine. His associate, Richard Tierney, became ill during 
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this time and seems to have abandoned the fight. Kelley 
maintained his zeal, but his position was tempered by a more 
realistic appraisal of Mexico's religious conflict. 5 
After 1923, Kelley no longer stressed non-recognition 
as a means of forcing the restoration of religious freedom 
in Mexico. He recognized that the country was in desparate 
need of outside investment to improve its economy. Kelley 
doubted that Americans would take financial risks in Mexico 
if they questioned the country's political stability or 
friendliness toward foreigners. The Bishop hoped to 
discourage Americans from investing in Mexico as long as the 
government there denied religious freedom. He believed that 
Mexican presidents would become more conciliatory toward the 
Church in order to attract foreign investors. 6 
In 1926, following the defiance of Archbishop Jose Mora 
y del Rio, President Calles expelled all foreign clergymen 
and enacted a new penal code. In March, Kelley addressed 
the Knights of Columbus in Brooklyn and claimed that the 
Mexican government had made an issue of religious 
persecution in order to hide an ulterior motive. The Bishop 
stated that Mexico's real intent was to steal American-owned 
properties. 7 
Kelley hoped to frighten United States investors into 
demanding intervention against Calles. He knew that the 
government would not interfere in Mexican affairs on behalf 
of the Church, but they might do so to protect American oil 
companies. Kelley's ploy to unite the oil interests to the 
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cause of the Church did not succeed; he then began to focus 
his protests on Mexico's supposed communism. 8 
In 1926, some Americans suspected that the Mexican 
government was communist. The State Department had received 
alarming reports of "radical anti-American propaganda by . . 
• Mexican officials."9 Both Presidents Obreg6n and Calles 
had supported the CROM, or the Confederaci6n Regional Obrera 
Mexicana, a labor organization formed in 1918 whose 
constitution included Marxist dogma. 1° Catholics also 
believed that the Constitution of 1917 was influenced by 
communist doctrine. Critics of the Mexican government 
referred to it as "Bolshevik," because the Bolsheviks 
denounced capitalism and were atheistic. 
Kelley believed that the communist threat in Mexico was 
real, but as Robert E. Quirk notes, the Mexican Revolution 
was not guided by any single ideology. The Revolution was 
pragmatic, adaptable, and personalistic. 11 The Church 
opposed secular reform movements because they subjected 
Catholic authority to State control. As a result, the 
Church considered anarchists, socialists, communists, and 
syndicalists threatening and categorized them as 
Bolsheviks. 12 Catholics were particularly alarmed by 
Marxism because its basis on a "classless society" denied 
the authority of social and political hierarchies. 13 
In September 1926, the Knights of Columbus compiled a 
pamphlet entitled "Red Mexico. " 14 Kelley contributed an 
article, and within a month, two million copies were 
distributed in the United States and Canada . 15 This 
publication equated the communist threat in Mexico to a 
disease. Catholic writers called it "vermin," an 
"infection," or the "red bacilli." In what is presumed to 
be Kelley's contribution to "Red Mexico," he claimed that 
the Revolution was causing the country to return to "pre-
Columbian barbarism. " 16 Evidently, he was referring to 
violence and the lack of Christian influence. 
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In the summer of 1926, Kelley wrote a vicious rebuttal 
to an article by several Protestant ministers, including 
Methodist Bishop James Cannon, that had appeared in Current 
History. Entitled "The Church and State Conflict in 
Mexico," the article defended the Revolution and said that 
Catholicism had been an impediment to Mexican progress. 
According to historian Mollie Davis, Protestant missionaries 
had visions of a "Protestant Mexico" as they witnessed the 
decline of Catholic influence. 17 
In Commonweal, Kelley responded by emphasizing the 
important role through education that the Church had played 
in Mexico's history. He denounced several of the ministers 
and blatantly remarked that Cannon, in particular, was a 
liar. Kelley directed his most bitter comment against 
Mexican liberals, who, he said, had a "pet dream of an 
alliance with our colored people and with the Jap." He does 
not explain this accusation, which was obviously meant to 
arouse popular fears. 18 
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In the same year, the U.P.C. News Service asked Kelley 
to write an article in answer to the question: "Is Mexico 
Dangerously Communistic?" Kelley replied that, "The only 
reason Mexico is not now a replica of Russia in its 
political life is the United States." Interestingly, 
though, in the same article, the Bishop declared that the 
Revolution would ultimately strengthen Catholicism. He 
stated that the Mexican Catholic "will be the better for it 
i n the end . . [i)t was evident that the century old sore 
would have to come to a head." Apparently, Kelley believed 
that the Revolution would force Catholics to reevaluate 
their faith and the Church's influence in their society. 19 
This type of article i ndicates the United States' 
preoccupation with communism during this time. Mollie Davis 
points out that in 1926 many national publications 
associated the Calles government with Bolshevism. The most 
vocal of these were America, Commonweal, Columbia, and the 
Hearst press. Other publications, however, especial ly the 
New Republic, Outlook, and The Nation, denounced this type 
of "Red" journalism.w The New York World stated that when 
articles referred to Mexico's "Bolshevism," they were really 
talking about nationalism. Many Americans considered the 
anti -revolutionary a r ticles pure propaganda. ~ 
Some Catholics, including Kelley, privately admitted 
that their own claims we re meant as propaganda. In August 
1926, Kelle y wrote a letter to J ohn J. Bur ke , Secreta ry of 
the National Catholic Welfare Conference, outlining a plan 
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that included the establishment of a "propaganda ofice 
[sic]." The Bishop told Burke that he intended to establish 
a national headquarters in Washington with Eber Cole Byam as 
its expert on Mexico.n 
Kelley's next step was to write a book answering all 
the charges that the Mexican government made against the 
Church. He said that this book would "be an epitome of 
Mexican history from the Catholic standpoint." The Bishop 
intended to sell a copy at cost to every priest in the 
United States. He would further ask that each priest buy 
extra copies to give to local Protestant clergymen, "heads 
of colleges, and .•• prominent politicians." The book 
would be mailed to senators, congressmen, and newspaper 
editors. Kelley estimated that the cost of carrying out 
this plan would be $10,000.~ 
Eber Cole Byam, by this time suffering from 
tuberculosis, assisted Kelley with this campaign. Kelley 
believed that Byam knew "more than any other man in the 
United States about Mexico." 24 Byam hoped to establish an 
organization in every parish to address the Mexican 
conflict. These groups would watch the newspapers for 
articles that favored Mexican radicals or that 
misrepresented Mexican history, and Bishop Kelley was to 
answer any such statements. When measures by the Mexican 
government affected the Church, Byam and Kelley planned to 
send letters of protest to senators and congressmen. Byam 
also wanted to create a central bureau of information under 
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Kelley's direction and establish an office in each diocese. 
He planned to use radio broadcasts to aid the cause and to 
secure pledges from wealthy Catholics for an endowment to 
establish a Bureau of Research for Catholic Defense.~ 
Other Catholics developed their own organizations to 
address political concerns of the Church. One of these 
groups was the National Catholic Welfare Conference, 
established in 1919. Mollie Davis called the NCWC the first 
major religious lobby in the United States. 26 In 1926, the 
Conference issued to President Coolidge a formal statement 
that criticized United States' policy in Mexico.n Kelley 
claimed that these efforts had an effect on at least the 
Mexican government when he stated that "the Calles crowd 
seems to be afraid of me and that is half the battle."~ 
There ~s no indication, however, that Calles feared American 
Catholics. 
Kelley and other Catholics vehemently opposed Calles 
because of his radical anti-clericalism. He was portrayed 
as the "Black Czar," and a pamphlet by that title and bound 
in black appeared in El Paso. The authors called Calles a 
drunkard, cattle thief, murderer, swindler, and commom 
bartender. The publication claimed that a colony of 
American communists was living in Mexico, and it mentioned 
the professor and political scientist Frank Tannenbaum as 
one of the group. It gave accounts of the execution of 
religious dissidents and even reproduced the ghastly photos 
of their last moments. Another pamphlet, published by Our 
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Sunday Visitor, claimed that "Calles carried in his pocket 
the power of attorney from one Nicolei Lenin."29 
Despite all the efforts to portray the Mexican 
government as communist, the campaign had little effect on 
the American public, who grew weary of the issue. In 1927, 
the Church hierarchy decided to lssue a formal letter to 
state its official views on the Mexican Church/State 
conflict and answer accusations that American clerics 
advocated political intervention in Mexican affairs. The 
pastoral letter avoided the mention of atrocities and 
emphasized the Church's contributions to Mexican culture.~ 
Robert E. Quigley found the letter so moderate that he did 
not think Kelley could have written it. 31 Kelley, however, 
indeed was the author of the letter, and Eber Cole Byam 
assisted him in writing it. The letter was later translated 
into German, Polish, French, and Spanish. 32 
When the American hierarchy issued its pastoral letter, 
Mexico was experiencing the Cristero Rebellion, which lasted 
until 1929. Foll owing the modus vivendi established 
between Church and State in that year, the religious 
question in Mexico remained somewhat peaceful until the 
administration of Lazaro Cardenas in 1934. Under Cardenas, 
congress amended the constitution, requiring that education 
be socialistic as well as secular. 33 The amendment caused 
some American Catholics to perceive Cardenas as an anti-
c l eric. The Catholic News prote ste d that the new textbooks 
issued under the Cardenas administration were irreligious 
and communistic.~ 
Kelley offered little protest against the Cardenas 
administration. He apparently grew tired of the struggle 
and resigned to the futility of his campaign. The Bishop 
turned his attention instead to the writing of Blood-
Drenched Altars, his history of Mexico from a Catholic 
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perspective. Kelley enlisted the assistance of Eber Cole 
Byam for this lengthy project and dedicated the book to him. 
Kelley said that he had seen a need for the book for over 
twenty years and that he had made two attempts to find 
someone else to write it. He finally decided to undertake 
the work himself "because no one else would." 35 
Among Kelley's papers is a pamphlet issued by the 
Cardenas administration and written by Emilio Fortes Gil, 
Interim President of Mexico from 1928 to 1930. It was an 
eloquent statement of the Revolution's stance toward the 
Catholic Church and no doubt prompted Bishop Kelley to write 
his own version of Mexican history. Fortes Gil defended the 
Revolution's attitude toward the Church by pointing out that 
"the Revolution cannot permit • . . the people [to be] 
steeped in ignorance and .•. poverty." He stated that 
"men can no longer submit to gregarious spirituality at the 
expense of knowledge in scientific truth." 36 
The author defended the confiscation of Church 
property, claiming that "wealth in the hands of the clergy 
has a tendency to remove it from the country so as to 
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support a foreign sovereignty." He went on to say that "the 
Indian never has understood and probably never will 
understand the true meaning of the Christian religion." He 
claimed that the native "priests were replaced by the 
Catholic clergy; their gods were replaced by the saints; 
their teocalli, by the Church; [and] their idols of stone . 
. by images of saints." These statements were intended to 
justify the legal restrictions of the Revolution. Kelley 
responded by issuing a defense of the Church in Mexico.n 
There is no doubt that Kelley's historical account is 
blatantly biased. He was pro-Spanish and a great admirer of 
Cortes. His analyses of Mexico's problems were highly 
simplistic, as were his solutions. He argued that the 
Church was a benevolent institution and that the reports of 
its vast wealth were greatly over-estimated. Kelley claimed 
that the Church had made Mexico a civilized nation. He 
believed that governments following independence attacked 
the Church out of greed. He described twentieth century 
persecution as sadism committed by "criminal perverts" under 
the sanction of their leaders. The Bishop admitted that he 
had "found no other explanation" because "no other seems 
possible. "38 
Kelley believed that Americans d isliked Mexicans 
because of "racial tradition and religious prejudice." He 
postulated that the United States inherited a hatred for 
Spain that dated to Queen Elizabeth and the Spanish 
Armada. 39 The Bishop justified the Spanish colonial system 
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by emphasizing that it assimilated the Indians into its 
culture and educated them.~ In an article written in 1926, 
Kelley had said that "[t]he Spanish found in Mexico a 
condition of cannibalistic savagery unequaled anywhere on 
earth." He noted that after the Revolution, the level of 
education in the country steadily declined.~ 
In Blood-Drenched Altars, Kelley mentioned several of 
the Church's contributions to Mexican society. He noted 
that the Church was responsible for the abolition of Indian 
slavery in the colonies.° Kelley also informed the reader 
that Catholicism was responsible for the construction of 
medical schools in New Spain that taught botany and 
chemistry and trained surgeons.c He remarked that Liberals 
criticized Catholic instruction, but he adds that if the 
Church had not undertaken the task of education, the 
Revolution would have considered it derelict in its duty. 44 
In this he is probably correct. 
Kelley made several other points in defense of the 
Church. He noted that the Spanish Crown held so much power 
over the Church in the New World that the Church was forced 
to defend the monarchy in order to survive. The appointment 
of the clergy in New Spain was in the hands of the Spanish 
kings, who also controlled the tithes. Therefore, the 
livelihood of these men depended on their loyalty. 45 Kelley 
also addressed accusations that the clergy in Mexico were 
corrupt and immoral. He noted that every family has its 
black sheep, but that this fact never justifies the 
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condemnation of the entire family.~ This is a weak defense 
because a shortage of rural clerics sometimes caused the 
hierarchy to ignore the problems. 
Kelley also defended the Church by attacking the 
Revolution. In the Bishop's view of Mexican history, Calles 
and Juarez were no better than conunon "thieves. "47 He 
believed that anti-clericalism was simply an excuse to rob 
the Church of its wealth. The Bishop claimed that in the 
twentieth century "radicals in conununication with Russia" 
persecuted the Church.~ 
In a review of Edward Alsworth Ross's The Social 
Revolution in Mexico, Kelley denounced the author's 
assumption that Spain was evil. Kelley disputed Ross's 
claims of the Church's wealth and offered his own estimate 
of $100,000,000 in 1829. According to historian Jan Bazant, 
who has done extensive research in this area, the Church's 
worth at the time of independence was approximately 
100,000,000 pesos. 49 Kelley compared his estimation with 
the holdings of American Protestant churches and inquired 
how United States' citizens would react if their own 
government confiscated that property. so 
Arguments about the Church's net worth are meaningless. 
As Michael P. Costeloe notes, the important factor is that 
the Catholic Church in Mexico was the "richest single 
corporation in the country. " 51 Throughout the colonial 
period, the Church alone had the resources to act as 
Mexico's primary banking institution. According to 
historian Karl Schmitt, "[a]griculture, industry, and 
commerce [were] . • • completely dependent on the pious 
funds. " 52 Therefore, Kelley's comparison between the 
Church's wealth in Mexico and that of all Protestant 
churches in the United States is misleading. 
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By the time that Kelley wrote his history of Mexico, he 
had altered his opinion of both Carranza and Obregon. He 
came to believe that each one belatedly recognized the value 
of the Church and regretted their actions against it. The 
Bishop was especially forgiving of Carranza because he had 
tried to modify the severity of the religious legislation 
toward the end of his administration. Kelley also noted 
that when the Mexican president died, he had been found 
wearing a crucifix and a religious medal.n 
Although Kelley's opinion softened toward these two 
men, he never relented in his animosity toward Wilson and 
Calles. In Blood-Drenched Altars, the Bishop wrote a 
twenty-one page attack against Calles, and he always 
referred to the Mexican leader as the "Iron Man." 54 As for 
Wilson, Kelley's bitterness was still apparant in 1939, when 
he wrote for America a retrospective article concerning 
Mexico during the Wilson administration. He continued to 
believe that Wilson was responsible for Mexico's political 
probl ems because of his "meddling." Kelley thought that 
Wilson was a pedant. He remarked that "anyone who can wave 
a magi c wand over words and make them line up and march in 
rhythmic swing is sure to find admirers." Kelley, however, 
thought that he would "reserve [his] adoration for truth" 
instead. 55 
Kelley's simplistic analysis of Mexican history was 
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characteristic of his attitude toward political and social 
questions in general. He attributed all social trends and 
actions to forces of good and evil. He himself stated that 
"we are changing the simple for the complex, thus 
multiplying our difficulti~s. " 56 Actually, he was able to 
explain compicated issues in simple and superficial ways. 
Like all of the Catholic propagandists at this time, 
Kelley placed anti-clericalism into two tidy categories. 
Masonry and greed led to persecution before the Russian 
Revolution; afterwards, Protestants and Bolsheviks 
encouraged it. There are some elements of truth in his 
accusations since Mexican Liberals were generally Masons, 
Protestant influence was strong in the northern border 
states, and many of the liberal reforms were socialist. 
Nevertheless, Kelley's analysis was simplistic. He did not 
recognize that personal resentment against clergymen often 
led to extreme anticlericalism, or that Liberals viewed the 
Church as an impediment to progress and the development of 
nationalism. Kelley and many other American Catholics came 
to their conclusions without having lived in Mexico and 
knowing very little about the country. Kelley personally 
visited Mexico only one time, in 1922, when he took a brief 
tour . 57 
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In spite of its flaws, Blood-Drenched Altars offers an 
opportunity to understand the Catholic perspective of the 
Church/State conflict. Perhaps its most important 
contribution is its emphasis on the Church's obvious 
benefits to Mexican society. One cannot doubt that its 
hospitals, libraries, schools, and charitable institutions 
were great assets to Mexican society. The Bishop also 
expressed admiration for the Spaniards for integrating the 
Indians into colonial society. 
When Kelley wrote Blood-Drenched Altars, he no longer 
entertained any illusions that the Church in Mexico would 
ever regain its former political status. All of his efforts 
to help restore the Church's influence had failed. His new 
hope was that the Church could operate autonomously and 
pe~cefully within its own realm. He recognized his defeat 
and wrote a book instead. With that book, he attempted to 
give back to the Mexican Church the dignity and respect that 
he felt it deserved. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
With the completion of Blood-Drenched Altars ln 1935, 
Kelley gave up his fight for the Mexican Church. His 
efforts to restore the Church to its former status had been 
in vain. The campaign had lasted for over twenty years; it 
had projected him into the public eye and made him one of 
the most recognized Catholics in the United States. Through 
time, he became more moderate and accepting of the Mexican 
Revolution. In the end, his purpose was to restore the 
image of the Church in Mexico as a valuable and beneficent 
institution in both the past and the present. He abandoned 
the idea that the Catholic Church must regain its old 
political status in order to be effective. His conclusions 
were not based on ideology but rather on pragmatism. 
A survey of Kelley's life exemplifies the fact that he 
loved the Church. He was not only quick to recognize the 
needs of his fellow Catholics but quick to respond to them 
as well. The formation of the Catholic Church Extension 
Society is an example of his readiness and ability to 
improvise solutions for complex problems that are large in 
scope. 
Although unsuccessful, Kelley's work on behalf of the 
Mexican clergy is another example of his determination to 
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assist the Church. He had confidence that he would succeed. 
This optimism allowed him to confront some of the most 
important world leaders of his time, including Woodrow 
wilson and William Jennings Bryan. Over the course of his 
crusade, he persisted even when his efforts met with 
disappointment. His several strategies did not fail for 
lack of effort but rather because Kelley had unrealistic 
expectations. 
Kelley had anticipated that the Mexican Revolution 
would produce the same results as those of the United States 
and France. He expected Mexico to extend the same freedom 
of religion outlined in the United States Bill of Rights. 
Kelley overlooked the fact that for over three hundred years 
the Catholic Church in Mexico held a monopoly in the 
religious and political spheres that was uncomparable to the 
Church/State relationship in the United States. He failed 
to realize that religious separation from t he motherland had 
already occurred before the English colonies achieved 
political independence. By contrast, in Mex ico's struggle 
for independence, a single religious institution was 
identified with the Old World system. 
As journalist Dudley G. Wooten remarks, "Catholicism, 
as part of the system of Spanish colonization, inevitably 
suffered from whatever penalties befell the conquerers in 
their final account with the conquered." The Mexican Church 
suffered a pai nful and forceful separation from the state, 
unlike the peaceful process experienced in the United 
States. Although harsh and extreme, the religious 
persecution that occurred during the Revolution is more 
easily understood when seen within this context.' 
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Kelley's efforts to discourage the diplomatic 
recognition of Venustiano Carranza failed because he 
misjudged Woodrow Wilson. Wilson's primary interests in 
regards to Mexico were American lives, property, and 
investments. Although the President was concerned about the 
persecution of Catholics, he considered the issue an 
internal matter for Mexicans. His decision to recognize the 
Constitutionalist regime was based on the fact that Carranza 
held military and political control over the country and 
that he promised to protect United States' interests. 
Wilson's recognition of Carranza produced an animosity 
in Kelley that eventually harmed the Bishop's image. Kelley 
supported Wilson's opponent, Charles Evans Hughes, in the 
election of 1916. In doing so, he earned the contempt of 
the Wilson administration, as well as many other Americans. 
Even some Catholics thought that Kelley should not have 
meddled in politics. 
Another reason for Kelley's failures in Mexico was his 
inability to appraise the sentiments of the American public. 
Kelley, along with many other Catholics, believed that the 
United States would intervene in the internal affairs of a 
foreign nation for the sake of religious freedom. As events 
were to demonstrate, citizenship became paramount over 
religious affiliation in determining when Americans would 
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consider interfering in Mexican politics. When Mexicans 
threatened American lives and property, the United States 
called for diplomatic or military action to curtail these 
excesses. When Mexicans mistreated their own countrymen or 
foreigners, however, Americans did not respond with the same 
sense of outrage. 
Kelley's next tactic was just as much a failure as his 
first one. If the Felix Diaz revolt had succeeded, the 
religious situation in Mexico might have improved. Kelley's 
actions on behalf of Diaz placed him under suspicion by the 
United States' government and further tarnished his ~mage. 
When it became evident that the United States 
government would not meddle in Mexico's internal religious 
conflicts, Kelley changed his strategy again. Mexico's 
acceptance of Carranza, Obregon, and Calles proved that the 
Revolution was a fact of life in Mexico. From that point 
forward, Kelley relied on propaganda to discourage economic 
investment in Mexico, when Mexican governments repressed the 
Church. He hoped that revolutionary presidents would refuse 
to enforce the religious clauses of the constitution in 
return for an assurance of American investment. 
The propaganda technique also failed to reap rewards. 
American businessmen did not rely on Catholic assessments of 
Mexico when making their decisions about investments there. 
They were no more dependent on Catholic opinion than the 
American government had been. Furthermore, the United 
States' public did not concern itself much with Catholic 
117 
propaganda. During the period, the country was still 
prejudiced against Catholics, and in fact, some Protestants 
hoped to proselytize Mexicans while the Church was being 
suppressed. Kelley overestimated his own influence and the 
Church's and the entire campaign simply dissolved. 
After many years of struggling to restore the Church's 
influence in Mexico, Kelley finally admitted defeat in 1935. 
He did not succeed in helping the Mexican Church for two 
reasons. As previously stated, one explanation for his 
failure stems from his lack of understanding of Mexico's 
history. He could not grasp the deep complexities of 
Mexico's relationship with Catholicism. Another reason 
centers on his inability to gauge public sentiment. He 
seemed to be convinced that Americans would intervene in 
Mexico's internal affairs to ensure religious freedom there. 
Although Bishop Kelley resolved himself to the Church's 
loss of influence in Mexico, he refused to admit that 
Catholicism had had negative effects on Mexico's historical 
development. His own version of Mexican history, Blood-
Drenched Altars, was his lasting tribute to the 
contributions of Spanish Catholicism to Mexico. 
Kelley's remaining years were not happy ones, as his 
failures brought disillusionment. In his autobiography, he 
remarked that as a young man he had been a great enthusiast 
about the human race. He went on to say that "each year of 
life after thirty seem[ed] to have lessened that 
enthusiasm." 2 In 1945, the Bishop suffered a series of 
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strokes that left him an embittered invalid until his death 
in 1948. 
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